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THE NON-PRECEDENTIAL PRECEDENT-LIMITED
PUBLICATION AND NO-CITATION RULES IN THE
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS*
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN**
"I think all I am speaking about is . . . a nonprecedential precedent." 1
INTRODUCTION

In recent years the federal courts of appeals have been beset by a
staggering increase in workload. 2 An oft-told story,3 numerical growth in
cases has been accompanied by an increase in the complexity of the tasks
that courts have recently undertaken-including supervision of school districts, reapportionment of legislatures, and oversight of prison systems.4 This
growth, however, has not been matched by a corresponding increment in the
number of judges.5 Hence, judges have been forced to handle an even heavier
workload. To cope with the increase the courts have experimented with a
number of techniques such as better internal administration 6 and reduction
• Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B. 1967, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1970,
Harvard University.
•• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo. B.A. 1970, University of Pennsylvania;
J.D. 1975, University of Maryland.
1. Hearings Before the Comm'n on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 537
(2d Phase 1974-1975) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (testimony of Judge Robert Sprecher of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit).
2. In fiscal 1965, the federal courts of appeals disposed of 5771 cases; in 1970, 10,699
cases; in 1977, 17,784 cases. [1977] ADMINISTI\ATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COUllTS
ANN. REP. 164 [hereinafter cited as ANNuAL REPORT].
3. A fair sample of the sources that have told the story includes National Labor Relations
Bd. V. Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970); COMMISSION ON REVISION
OP THE FEDERAL COUllT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES! REc:oM·
MBNDATIONS FOR CHANGE 55 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA REPORT]; Haworth, Screening
and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257 and
sources cited therein at n.2.
4. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281 (1976); Special Project-The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 784 (1978).
5. In 1965 there were 78 authorized circuit judgeships; by 1970 the number had increased
to 97, where it remains at present. [1977] ANNUAL REPoRT, supra note 2, at 164. A statute to
increase substantially the number of federal circuit judgeships has recently been enacted. Pub.
L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978).
6. A concise summary of some of these efforts can be found in Betten, Institutional
Reform In the Federal Appellate Courts, 52 IND. L.J. 101 (1976).
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in oral argument. 7 One of the most significant of these efforts has been the
attempt to reduce time spent on preparing opinions by limiting the number
of decisions that are published and by limiting or forbidding the citation of
unpublished opinions. In the last few years all of the federal courts of appeals
have promulgated rules or adopted plans to that end. This Article will discuss
the history of those rules and will examine closely their content. Finally, it
will evaluate arguments relating to the desirability and wisdom of court rules
that limit the publication and citation of opinions.

I.

HISTORY

Judges, practitioners, and scholars agree that the caseload of the courts
of appeals is becoming unmanageable.8 Although there may be spirited
dispute as to the causes of the overload,9 the numbers cannot be challenged:
since 1965 the caseload has almost tripled.10 This growth has raised concerns
over the quality of judicial performance. Chief Judge Seitz of the Third
Circuit, for example, recently commented:
I hope I am not telling secrets when I say that there was an overwhelming feeling that in deciding, as they do now, some 240 cases
a year, they [the circuit judges] were perilously close to compromising the integrity of the decision making process. By this I mean
that the judges were concerned whether they had sufficient "thinking" and research time to feel reasonably satisfied with their votes
in all the 240 or more appeals on which they sat.l1
Dissatisfaction with the volume of published opinions is not a new
phenomenon.12 As early as 1915 a prominent judge observed that the federal
7. For a survey of the proposals to reduce oral argument, see 2 ADVISORY CoUNCIL FOR
APPELLATE JUSTICE, APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, at 2-32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE
JUSTICE: 1975].
8. See Haworth, supra note 3, at 257 n.2.
9. For some enlightened speculation on the causes of overload, see Carrington, Crowded
Dockets and the Courts oj Appeals: The Threat to the Function oj Review and the National
Law, 82 HAR.v. L. REv. 542 (1969); Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs oj
the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 576 (1974).
10. See note 2 supra. It should be noted that the number of judgeships bas increased over
this period by only 25%. See note 5 supra. Haworth, supra note 3, at 260, estimated that by
1981 the caseload "would require 38 nine-judge courts of appeals, each handliog a caseload
equal to that now handled by the District of Columbia Circuit." Such a growth in the number
of federal appellate courts might alter their character significantly, and perhaps dilute tho
quality of their work.
11. Remarks by Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz, Third Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 22,
1976).
12. For good summaries of the early literature favoring limitations on opinion writing,
see Chanin, A Survey oj the Writing and Publication oj Opinions in Federal and State Appellate Courts, 67 LAw Lm. J. 362 (1974); Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of tlze
Publication oj Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REv. 791 (1975).
The earliest efforts to limit publication of judicial opinions in the federal courts of appeals
stem from the late 1940's in the Fifth Circuit and the Third Circuit. See O'Connell, A
Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 13 (1949); Whitehair, Opinions ol Courts:
Fifth Circuit Acts Against Unneeded Publication, 33 A.B.A. J. 751 (1947); Opinions ol
Courts: Should Number Published be Reduced?, 34 A.B.A. J. 668 (1948) (a report to the
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and state courts of last resort had produced over 65,000 opinions, filling 630
volumes, in the five years between 1908 and 1913.13 Another writer noted
that in the year ending June 30, 1915, 175,000 pages of law reports from
the American state and federal systems were added to the library of the
Harvard Law School.14 These figures were alarming at the time, because it
was thought that no private lawyer, judge, or law professor could possibly
remain current with the avalanche of decisional law. One commentator
lamented:
Looking ahead a half century to the time when there shall be two
or three times as many inhabitants within our borders and a corresponding increase in our litigation, what are we to expect if the
present rate of production of precedents be maintained? The law
library of the future staggers the imagination as one thinks of
multitudes of shelves which will stretch away into the dim distance,
rank upon rank, and tier upon tier, all loaded with their many
volumes of precious precedents. One shrinks from the contemplation of the intellectual giants who will be competent to keep track
of the authorities and make briefs in those days; they, as well as the
judges who pass upon the briefs, must needs be supermen indeed.15
Recognition of the problem led to examination of ways to streamline
the appellate process, including consideration of whether the number of
opinions published should be reduced. Early commentators suggested that
not all decisions merit reasoned opinions and surely not all opinions merit
publication. They crystallized their suggestions into proposed sets of standards for determining which cases deserve written opinions and which of those
should be published.1 6
Limited publication has been considered by the federal judicial establishment since the 1940's.17 In 1971, ·the effort began to accelerate; the
eleventh annual Judicial Conference for the Third Circuit of the United States). These efforts
were not overwhelmingly successful. See Prince, Law Books, Unlimited, 48 A.B.A. J. 134, 136
(1962).
13. Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 !LL. L. REv. 157, 158 (1915). While fond
of noting statistics and making dire predictions, Judge Winslow maintained a sense of humor.
On his opening page, he relates the story of a judge who was drafting an opinion in his
chambers "surrounded by a small fortification of law books." An old colleague of his, stopping
by to visit the judge and astounded to find him so beseiged, produced a remark that is surely
the cleverest if not the most genteel dictum to be pronounced on the subject of legal prolixity:
"Penney, [the name of the beleaguered judge] I'd rather be a dog and chew rags for a
papermill than have your job."
14. Warren, The Welter of Decisions, 10 !LL. L. REv. 472, 472-73 (1916). The statistics
reported in this Article seem ludicrously small by today's standards. The totals mentioned are
almost surely matched today by the output of only two or three large states. See also Prince,
supra note 12, at 134, for alarming statistics in terms of the number of "miles" of law reports
in our large libraries.
15. Winslow, supra note 13, at 158.
16. See, e.g., Whitehair, supra note 12, at 843; Winslow, supra note 13, at 161.
17. Early efforts occurred in the Third and Fifth Circuits. See note 12 supra for the
relevant sources. The subject was also raised at the 1964 meeting of the Judicial Conference
of the United States. The Conference adopted a resolution holding: "That the judges of the
courts of appeals and the district courts authorize the publication of only those opinions which
are of general precedential value and that opinions authorized to be published be succinct."
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Federal Judicial Center's 18 Annual Report for that year noted a "widespread
consensus that too many opinions are being printed or published or othenvise
disseminated." 19 There was no agreement, however, on how the problem
should be attacked. The report noted that the Center would continue to
compile information on the federal and state court approaches to limiting
publication.20 These efforts ended in a short report made by the Board of
the Federal Judicial Center to the Judicial Conference of the United States,21
stating that the needless proliferation of published decisional law had created
serious problems. The Board recommended that the Judicial Conference
direct each circuit council to review its publication policy and to implement
the following modifications:
a. Opinions will not be published wlless ordered by a majority of
the panel rendering the decision;
b. Non-published opinions should not be cited, either in briefs or
in court opinions;
c. When an opinion is not published the public record shall be
completed by publishing the judgment of the Court.22
At its October, 1972, session, the Judicial Conference approved the circulation of the Center's report to all circuit judges and requested that each circuit
develop an opinion publication plan.23
Meanwhile, work on model standards continued at the Judicial Center.24
The Advisory Council for Appellate Justice,25 a distinguished group of law[1964] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REP. 11. This resolution did not produce
the systematic limited publication plans that are the subject of much of this Article. Some of
the circuits had, however, already begun selective publication as part of their screening procedures. The Fourth Circuit took the additional step of urging that unpublished decisions not be
cited to the court. See Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972).
As a result, the Fourth Circuit has been called "tl1e probable mother of the non-publication
system." Remarks of John P. Frank, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 29, 1976).
18. The Federal Judicial Center was established in 1967 by the Federal Judicial Center
Act, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 664 (codified at 28 U.S. C. §§ 620-629 (1976) ). The Act
specifies four functions of the Center: (1) to research and study the operation of the federal
court system; (2) to develop improved techniques of judicial administration; (3) to stimulate,
create, and conduct programs of continuing education and training for all personnel of tho
federal judiciary; and ( 4) to provide staff, research, and planning assistance to the Judicial
Conference of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 620(b) (1976). A thorough exposition of tho
Center's genesis and present functions may be found in Clark, The Federal Judicial Center,
1974 ARiz. ST. LJ. 537. The author, Justice Tom C. Clark, served as the first Director of tho
Center.
19. [1971] FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ANN. REP. 7-8.
20. ld.
21. BOARD OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE
APRIL 1972 SESSION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE PUBLICATION
OF COURTS OF APPEALS OPINIONS (1972).
22. Id. at 1.
23. [1972] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REP. 33. Originally the plans
were to be submitted by January 1, 1973. The deadline was subsequently extended to December
31, 1973. [1973] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REP. 5.
24. [1972] FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ANN. REP. 6.
25. The most succinct explanation for the origin and purpose of the Advisory Council for
Appellate Justice appears as a preface to its pamphlet, ADVISORY CouNCIL FOR APPELLATE
JUSTICE, FJC REsEARCH SERIES No. 73-2, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
(1973) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS]:
The Federal Judicial Center brought together on September 24-25, 1971, a group of
distinguished lawyers, law teachers and judges for the purpose of commencing a study
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yers, law teachers, and judges, brought together by the Judicial Center,
produced a draft report that considered standards for publication, procedures
for deciding which opinions should be published, and the desirability of
allowing citation of unpublished opinions.26 After further revisions, this
report was published in pamphlet form by the Federal Judicial Center under
the title Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions.27 The Model Rule 28
suggested by the report has been the template for many of the rules subsequently promulgated by the United States courts of appeals.
By its spring 1974 session, the Judicial Conference had received from
the circuits the proposed plans it had requested. The report of the Conference reveals its satisfaction with the progress made by the circuits' efforts at
in depth of the appellate systems of the United States, both state and Federal. The
work was undertaken in the realization that present-day appellate processes are already
under dangerous pressure and that the case-loads to be anticipated in the near future
cannot be handled without basic changes in the staffing, structure, organization and
work habits of the appellate courts. Those who attended the first conference named
themselves the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice and selected as Chairman
Maurice Rosenberg, Nash Professor of Law at Columbia University.
Shortly after the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice commenced its work the
National Center for State Courts was established. The activities of the Council have
been supported for almost two years by grants administered through the State Courts
Center. Both Judicial centers have participated in the Council's labor and have received advice from the Council and its members on many occasions. We regard this
cooperative effort as a particularly happy example of state-federal teamwork.
26. This report, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions (1973) was the work of the
Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies, a sub-unit of the Advisory Council for
Appellate Justice. The members of the Committee were Harold Leventhal, Carl McGowan,
Russell Niles, Walter Schaeffer, Roger Traynor, Bernard E. Witkin, and Charles W. Joiner
(Chairman). As far as the authors know, this report is unpublished and unavailable except in
the National Archives. It can be found there in the files of the Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System-Document #454.
27. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25 (report of ComJnittee on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice).
28. The Model Rule provides:
1. Standard for Publication
An opinion of the (highest court) or of the (intermediate court) shall not be
designated for publication unless:
a. The opinion establishes a new rule or law or alters or modifies an existing rule;
or
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
2. Opinions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges
participating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in
section (1) of this rule is satisfied. Concurring opinions shall be published only jf
the majority opinion is published. Dissenting opinions may be published if the
dissenting judge deterinines that a standard for publication as set out in section (1)
of this rule is satisfied. The (highest court) may order any unpublished opinion
of the (intermediate court) or a concurring or dissenting opinion in that court
published.
3. If the standard for publication as set out in section (1) of the rule is satisfied as
to only a part of an opinion, only that part shall be published.
4. The judges who decide the case shall consider the question of whether or not to
publish an opinion in the case at the conference on the case before or at the time
the writing assignment is made, and at that time, if appropriate, they shall make
a tentative decision not to publish.
5. All opinions that are not found to satisfy a standard for publication as prescribed
by section (1) of this rule shall be marked, Not Designated for Publication.
Opinions marked, Not Designated for Publication, shall not be cited as precedent
by any court or in any brief or other materials presented to any court.
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limiting publication. While the proposed plans were not identical, the Conference found their divergence a useful experimental tool in arriving at a
settled position on publication.29
At the same time that the Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial
Conference of the United States were studying the problem, the Commission
on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System conducted a separate
inquiry. The Commission, chaired by Senator Roman Hruska, was composed
of members of Congress, judges, teachers, and lawyers. Its congressional
mandate 80 was, first, to study and report on the present division of the
United States into the several judicial circuits and, second, to study and
report on the structure and internal procedures of the courts of appeals. As
part of the latter endeavor, the Commission considered the question of
opinion writing and publication in those courts. The Commission held
hearings in 1974 and 1975 and issued its final report in June, 1975. Concerning the problem of limited publication, the commission first recommended
that "in every case there be some record, however brief and whatever the
form, of the reasoning which impelled the decision." 81 A majority of the
Commission recommended selective publication and the adoption of nocitation rules. 82 Ultimately, however, the Commission reserved judgment on
those issues and left the problem with the Judicial Conference.88
The present state of limited publication/no-citation controversy is much
as the Judicial Conference left it in 1974. The experimentation continues.
The several circuits have devised plans to limit publication that differ not
only in their technical particulars but also in their treatment of the basic
jurisprudential questions that result from decisions not to publish or permit
citation of opinions.
29. The Conference Report noted:
While the plans of each circuit generally follow the basic reco=endations of tho
report of the Federal Judicial Center to the April 1972 meeting of the Judicial
Conference, each circuit, to a limited extent, is experimenting with respect to somo
phases of its plan. There are in effect 11 legal laboratories accumulating experienco
and amending their publication plans on the basis of that experience. Because the
possible rewards of such experimentation are so rich, the Conference agreed that it
should not be discontinued until there is considerably more experience under the
diverse circuit plans.
[1974] JUDICIAL CoNF.I!RENCB OF THE UNITED STATES REP. 12.
30. Act of Oct. :13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1976) ).
i
31. HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 3, at 50,
32. Id. at 51.
33. The Commission concluded:
We have not attempted to exhaust the range of solutions, nor to choose between
them. The Judicial Conference of the United States retains a continuing interest in
the resolution of these problems; experimentation in the various circuits is continuing;
empirical data are being collected; a range of alternatives is being explored. Wo
recognize the Judicial Conference as an appropriate forum and do not believe that
it would serve a useful function for the Commission to attempt, by specific recom·
mendation, to foreclose that further study which the problem deserves.
Id. at 52.
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POSITIONS OF THE CmCUI'l'S

Each circuit has adopted some position on the limited publication/nocitation problem.34 While these positions are not easily categorized, it is
possible to identify certain issues in the limited publication debate and to
compare the positions of the circuits on those issues. The positions of the
circuits on each issue are schematically summarized in Tables I and IT at the
end of this Article.
A.

Decisions Without Articulated Reasons

Three circuits permit dispositions with no :reasoned opinion at all.
The entire decision consists of a single word: "AFFIRMED" or "ENFORCED." 35 Rule 21 of the Fifth Circuit, the first circuit to employ this
procedure, provides that
When the court determines that any one or more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted to
the court for decision: (1) that a judgment of the district court is
based on findings of fact which are, not clearly erroneous; {2) that _
the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that
the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial
evi'dence on the record as a whole; ( 4) that no error of law appears; and the court also determines that an opinion would have
no precedential value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or
enforced without opinion.
In such case, the court may in its discretion enter either of the
34. Pursuant to the request of the Judicial Conference, all of the circuits have filed
limited publication plans: some, in addition, have local rules that address the question. A
circuit's position on the various issues in the debate can be determined only by looking at
both its plan and any relevant local rules. The following are the relevant rules of the several
circuits:
District of Columbia-Rule S(f), Rule 13(c)
First Circuit
-Rule 14
-Rule 0.23
Second Circuit
-(Plan only)
Third Circuit
-Rule 18
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
-Rule 21
Sixth Circuit
-Rule 11
Seventh Circuit
-Rule 35
Eighth Circuit
-Rule 14
-Rule 21
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
-Rule 17
In the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the plan consists simply of the
text of the rule. In the Third Circuit, there is no relevant local rule. In the remainder, the
publication plan is distinct from the local rules on the question. In two circuits (the First and
the Eighth), the publication plans appear as appendices to the circuit's local rules. The publication plans for the remaining circuits can be found in J. SPANIOL, REPORT ON THE OPERATION
OF Cmcurr OPINION PUBLICATION PLANS FOR 1977, app. C [plans hereinafter cited as [Cir. No.]
Circuit Plan].
Mr. Spaniol is the Executive Assistant to the Director of the Administrative Office of the
Courts. He has prepared similar reports to the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction of the
Committee on Court Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 1973,
1974, 1975, and 1977. These reports contain (in addition to the text of each circuit's publication plan) a wealth of information on the operation of the plans. [Each report hereinafter
cited as [year] PUBLICATION PLANS REPORT].
35. See 5TH Cm. R. 21, 8TH em. R. 14, lOTH em. R. 17(b).
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following orders: "AFFIRMED. See Local Ru1e 21," or "ENFORCED. See Local Rule 21." 3 6
The ru1es of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits are substantially the same.87 The
Second, Third, and District of Columbia Circuits have slightly different rules
which permit disposition by summary order,88 and each of those circuits
makes substantial use of the procedure.89 Several other circuits have similar
ru1es but make no extensive use of these procedures.40
A key characteristic of decisions without opinions is their failure to
provide the parties or the court below with any hint as to the court's reasoning. Accordingly, the practice under these rules has been uniformly condemned by commentators,41 lawyers,42 and judges.48 These criticisms seem
36. 5TH Cm. R. 21.
37. Rule 14 of the Eighth Circuit tracks Fifth Circuit Rule 21 word for word, substituting
only the number "14" for "21" in the last sentence. Rule 17(b) of the Tenth Circuit provides
as follows:
After argument when the court determines that one or more of the following
circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted to the court for decision:
(1) that a judgoient of the district court is based on findings of fact which are not
clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient;
(3) that the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole; and (4) that no error of law appears; the court may in
its discretion and without written opinion enter either of the following orders:
"AFFIRMED. See Rule 17(b)", or "ENFORCED. See Rule 17(b)".
38. D.C. Cm. R. 14(d), for example, reads as follows:
(c) Order form of decision. In accordance with recommendations for improvement of judicial administration, this court may, while according full consideration of
the issues, dispense with opinions where the issues occasion no need therefor, and
confine its action to such abbreviated disposition as it may deem appropriate, e.g.,
affirrnance by order of a decision or judgment of a court or administrative agency;
a judgment, or affirmance or reversal, containing a notation of precedents, or accompanied by a brief. memorandum. See Rule 8 (f).
See also 2D CIR. R. 0.23; the Third Circuit's manual, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES 6, 7.
39. In 1977, 20% of the cases, disposed of after hearing a submission by the D.C. Circuit
were handled pursuant to rule 13(c). The figure for the Second Circuit is likewise approximately 20%. In the Third Circuit, more than one half of all the cases decided nfter hearing
on submission were disposed of by Judgment Order. See 1977 PUBLICATION PLANS REPORT,
supra note 34, app. B, at 1-4.
40. The First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits fall within this category.
1sr. Cm. R. 14 provides in relevant part: "14. Opinions. Because of the increase in filings,
the court finds itself unable to write opinions, or file opinions, in every case."
7TH Cm. R. 35(c)(2)(ii) provides that unpublished orders "[m]ay contain reasons for the
judgment but ordinarily not a complete nor necessarily any statement of the facts. • • ."
Ordinarily, the Seventh Circuit does provide adequate written reasons for its orders. Hearings,
supra note 1, at 471-75 (testimony of Edward H. Hickey, President, Bar Association of the
Seventh Federal Circuit).
9TH Cm. R. 21(a) defines an "ORDER" as a disposition of a case without articulated
reasons. In the past three years, it has disposed of no cases by order. See 1975, 1976, 1977
PuBLICATION PLANs lb!PORTS, supra note 34, app. B.
41. See Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CoRNELL
L. REv. 128, 134-35 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Unreported Decisions]; Hearings, supra
note 1, at 933 (testimony of Professor Charles R. Haworth); id. at 951 (testimony of Professor Paul D. Carrington).
42. Hearings, supra note 1, at 555 (1974) (te!timony of Willard J. Lassers on Behalf of
the American Civil Liberties Union, ntinois Division, and the Chicago Lawyers Committee for
Civil Rights Under ~aw); id. at 451-52 (testimony of Edward H. Hickey, President, Bar
Association of the Seventh Federal Circuit).
~3. Id. at 826 (testimony of Judge William E. Doyle of the Tenth Circuit); ld. at 1107
(testimony of Judge Byron G. Skelton of the Court of Claims). See also HRUSKA REPOB.T,
mpra note 3, at 49-53.
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well founded. First, there is the danger that without the pressure created by
a need to expose its reasons to public scrutiny the court will decide a case
without reasons or with inadequate ones. This is not to suggest that a court
would consciously decide a case arbitrarily, but most who have done legal
writing would agree that the process of committing words to paper often
tests the structure of the argument and perhaps even the result. Absent the
discipline imposed by the requirement that some written record be produced,
sloppy logic or first impressions may govern. As Karl Llewellyn observed:
"Affirmed on the authority of Older v. Younger" may say the same
thing and mean the same thing as "The case falls within the reason
of Older v. Younger. Affirmed." But in from two to six cases out
of ten the latter phrasing runs a real chance of inducing a longer
and a deeper look at the controlling case, in the way in which
controlling cases should be looked at.44
Furthermore, a court, if so minded, might use this abbreviated judgment
procedure to duck issues, avoid making troublesome decisions, or conceal
divisions within the court or the panel.45
Even if the court is conscientious and carefully avoids these two
difficulties, however, problems with the one word decision remain. Justice
must not only be done, it must also appear to be done. A one word
disposition leaves the parties and their counsel with no indication of the
court's reasoning and, therefore, practically invites the losing litigant to
suspect that the court has not adequately considered the case or has reached
its judgment through impermissible means. In other words, a court asks too
much when it asks that its decision be accepted as the correct result achieved
after reasoned deliberation when no reasons at all appear. A final difficulty
with the one word decision is that it may leave the Supreme Court with an
insufficient record on which to base a decision.46
44. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 312 (1960).
45. The Fifth Circuit, the principal innovator in the use of the one word disposition, has
carefully cautioned against such misuse of its rule 21. See National Labor Relations Bd. v.
Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970).
46. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972). In Taylor, the district court, with the
aid of a special master, ordered the reapportionment of four legislative districts in the New
Orleans area. Extensive hearings were held by the master, and the district court made a finding
that reapportionment was required, expressly rejecting an alternative proposal of the Louisiana
Attorney GeneraL Bussie v. Governor of Louisiana, 333 F. Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. La.),
modified sub nom. Bussie v. McKeithen, 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971), remanded sub nom.
Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972). The court of appeals reversed without opinion and
adopted the state Attorney General's plan. The Supreme Court remanded, noting that:
An exaniination of the record in this case suggests that the Court of Appeals may
have believed that benign districting by federal judges is itself unconstitutional
gerrymandering even where (a) it is employed to overcome the residual effects of
past state dilution of Negro voting strength and (b) the only alternative is to leave
intact the traditional "safe" white districts. If that were in fact the reasoning of the
lower court [the Court of Appeals], then this petition would present an iroportant
federal question ••••
Because this record does not fully inform us of the precise nature of the litigation
and because we have not had the benefit of the insight of the Court of Appeals, we
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For these reasons the use of one word dispositions should be abolished.
A short statemen.t of reasons may be sufficient in simple, repetitive cases, but
some reason should be given in every case.

B. Criteria for Publication
The publication plan of each circuit provides standards for determining
which opinions should be reported. Some of these guidelines are vague and
general. The First Circuit provides the best example of this approach:
Our test, broadly phrased, is whether the district courts, future
litigants, or we ourselves would be likely to benefit from the opportunity to read or cite the opinion . • •••1
The Second,48 Third, 49 Fifth,li0 and Sixth lil Circuits have similarly amorphous
standards.
The remainder of the circuits have more detailed criteria for publication
that are, to a greater or lesser extent, descendants of the Standards for
Publication of Judicial Opinions, authored by the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice. The Standards provide for publication when:

--

a. The opinion establishes a new rule or law or alters or modifies
an existing rule; or
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority.Ga
The circuits have added several new criteria to the list as suggested by
experience and comment Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit's plan
provides for publication of an opinion if it "applies an established rule of law
to a factual situation significantly different from that in published cases." lls
The rationale for this criterion is clear: the law often progresses as much by
applying old rules to new facts as by propounding new rules, and such
progress should not be lost by failure to report these decisions. Another
addition, which is found in the local rules of the Fourth Circuit, provides for
grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and remand the
case to the Coun of Appeals for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
407 U.S. at 193-94 (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied). It should be noted that Taylor
represents an unwarranted application of Fifth Circuit Rule 21. Taylor involved a reversal of
the lower court; rule 21, however, provides only for aflirmances without opinion.
47. Plan for the Publication of Opinions, 1ST Cm. R. app. B.
48. 2D CIR. R 0.23.
49. Third Circuit Plan, supra note 34.
50. 5rn CIR. R 21.
51. Sixth Circuit Plan, supra note 34.
52. STANDARDS FOR PUl!LICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25. Other circuits using
this format are the District of Columbia, the Fourth, the Seventh, the Eighth, the Ninth, and
the Tenth.
53. District of Columbia Circuit Plan, supra note 34, para. e. The Eighth Circuit Plan has
a similar provision. See Plan for the Publication of Opinions, Srn Cm. R app., para. 4(a).
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publication of an opinion if "[i]t is a case in which there is a published
opinion below." 64 The justification for this rule is that a court of appeals
may reverse a published lower court opinion or affirm it on different
grounds; 66 if the lower court opinion were published and the court of appeals
opinion left unpublished, lawyers could easily be misled. More ambitiously,
the Seventh Circuit provides for publication of any of its opinions that "(iv)
constitute a significant and non-duplicative contribution to the legallite:rature
(A) by a historical review of law; (B) by describing legislative history; or
(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law •..." 66 Judicial discussions of legislative history and historical reviews of law have value, of course,
as aids for further legal development; hence their inclusion in the publication
list is warranted. Finally, the Ninth Circuit has a unique resurrection rule
providing for publication of an opinion that "calls attention to a rule of law
which appears to have been generally overlooked ...." 67
If there are to be unpublished opinions,5 8 plans with specific criteria are
preferable to broad, generally worded plans. The notion of "an opinion
which has precedential value" is too vague to be applied without error,
primarily because of the difficulty of appreciating "precedential value" at the
time of decision. Under such a standard important cases will go unpublished.
If the consumers of the court's product must trust the judges to make correct
and consistent decisions in cases that are unreported and thus subject to
minimal scrutiny, they should at least be assured that the judges look to
standards as definite as possible in determining which cases in fact go unreported.69 In sum, efforts to augment the original Standards for Publication
of Judicial Opinions should be encouraged in order to ensure that significant
legal developments are not lost or suppressed.
C.

Decision Procedures

In addition to elaborating standards for the publication of opmmns,
the circuits have tried to establish procedures for deciding whether they have
been met. A common approach is to establish a presumption against publication. This presumption sometimes takes the form of a clearly articulated
statement. The First Circuit, for example, has noted:
While we do not presently attempt to categorize the criteria which
should determine publication, we are confident that a significantly
54. 4TH Cm. R. 18(a) (vi). Other circuits have similar provisions. See Sixth Circuit
Plan, supra note 34, para. 1; 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(1){v); Plan for the Publication of Opinions,
8TH CIR. R. app., para. 4(e); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b){5).
55. The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, calls for publication only of opinions that "[r]everse
a judgment or deny enforcement of an order when the lower court or agency has published an
opinion supporting the order." 7TH Cm. R. 35(c) (1) (v).
56. 7TH Cm. R. 35(c)(1)(iv). Other circuits have similar provisions: District of Columbia
Plan, supra note 34, para. d; 4TH CIR. R. 18{a) (iv); Plan for the Publication of Opinions,
8TH Cm. R. app., para. f.
57. 9TH Cm. R. 21(b) (2).
58. See notes 87-181 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the advisability of a
limited publication regime.
59. A similar conclusion is reached by Unreported DecisiolU, supra note 41, at 147.
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larger proportion of cases will result in unpublished decisions if the
court adopts a policy of self conscious scrutiny of the publishworthiness of each disposition coupled with a presumption, in the
absence of justification, against publication.5°
Sometimes the presumption is merely an inference drawn from the grammatical form of the standards.61 Such presumptions are not universal, however,- for the publication plans of the District of Columbia, Second, Fifth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits do not include presumptions against publication.
Discontent has been expressed with presumptions of non-publication, 62 the
view being that while the dangers associated with non-publication 8 could
never be wholly eliminated, they would be diminished if courts were required
affirmatively to decide that an opinion does not merit general dissemination.
Separate from the issue of presumptions is the question of how the
decision on publication is to be made. The great majority of the circuit plans
indicate that the decision is to be made by the majority of the panel that
hears the case.64 The Fourth Circuit plan provides that a decision to publish
may be made by either a majority of the panel or the author. 05 The Second
Circuit requires a unanimous decision by the panel for a case to be disposed
of without a published opinion. 66
Does a dissenting judge have a "right" to publish in majority-rule circuits? Four circuits provide for the right of any judge on the panel to
publish a concurring or dissenting opinion in a case, even though the majority
opposes publication. 67 The Ninth Circuit goes further and provides for publication in cases where the majority opinion "[i]s accompanied by a separate
concurring or dissenting expression, and the author of such separate expression desires that it be reported or distributed to regular subscribers." 08
Two circuits, the Seventh69 and Ninth,70 permit some input into the
publication decision from outside the court. Seventh Circuit Rule 35(d) (3)

°

60. Plan for the Publication of Opinions, 1ST Cm. R. app. B. In the Seventh Circuit, the
policy statement is also clear. 7TH Cm. R. 35(a) indicates that "[i]t is the policy of this circuit
to reduce the proliferation of published opinions." The Third Circuit provides for a presumption against reporting of per curiam opinions, and a presumption in favor of reporting signed
opinions. Judgment orders are never reported. Third Circuit Plan, supra note 34, para. 1, 4, S.
61. The Fourth Circuit, for example, before listing its publication standards, provides that
"an opinion shall not be published unless it meets one of the following standards for publica·
tion •..•" 4TH Cm. R. 18(a). Similar wording is to be found in the plans of the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits. See Sixth Circuit Plan, supra note 34; 9TH Cm. R. 21(b).
62. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 794-95 (testimony of Professor Martha A. Field).
63. See notes 116-81 and accompanying text infra.
64. The circuits which require a decision by the majority of the panel are the District of
Columbia, the First, the Third, the Sixth, the Seventh, the Eighth, the Ninth and the Tenth.
65. 4TH Cm. R. 18(b),
66. 2D em. R. 0.23.
67. The District of Columbia, the Seventh, the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits have such

rules.

68. 9TH Cm. R. 21(b)(6).
69. 7TH Cm. R. 35(d){3).
70. 9TH Cm. R. 21(f).
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provides that: "Any person may request by motion that a decision by unpublished order be issued as a published opinion. The request should state
the reasons why the publication would be consistent with the guidelines for
disposition of appeals as set forth in this rule." 71 The rules of these circuits
were clearly intended to decrease the likelihood that an important decision
will be lost because it is unreported, since either the public spirit or the
self-interest of litigants will encourage them to request the publication of
favorable precedents. A difficulty that has been noted, however, is that an
outside request rule favors the institutional or habitual litigant. Such a
litigant will always request publication of a favorable outcome, because his
future chances of success in the court may depend on his ability to rely on
that case. His opponent, an occasional litigant, would not have such a
powerful incentive. Consider, for example, a typical habitual litigant, the
United States Attorney. He might often oppose a private attorney, a small
fraction of whose practice is criminal defense work. In such cases, the
differential interest in having an opinion published, once the case is decided,
is high. The result could well be that the published (precedential) law of
the circuit would develop in a lopsided fashion. 72

D. Citation and Precedent78
The Circuit court rules forbidding citation of unpublished opinions have
caused more controversy than any other facet of the limited publication de71. 7TH em. R. 35(d)(3). 9TH Cm. R. 21(f) is similar.
72. This argument is made forcefully by Willard J. Lassers, on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union, illinois Division, and the Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, Hearings, supra note 1, at 557:
There is another consideration, less subtle. Major litigants are able to request publication of decisions of importance to them. This is not a mere speculative observation. We refer to the case of Haines v. Otto Kerner, et al., 7th Circuit, No. 72-1972.
This was a suit regarding prisoners' civil rights where the Court ruled, among other
things, that 15 days' solitary confinement was not cruel and unusual punishment and
that Miranda warnings did not apply to prison disciplinary proceedings. The suit
was defended by the illinois Attorney General. After the case was disposed of by an
unpublished order on January 31, 1974, the Attorney General moved that the order
be published and it was subsequently published in the Federal Reporter, at 492 F.2d
937, Major litigants or attorneys having special interests thus can request publication
of opinions favorable to them while not requesting publication of unfavorable decisions. Their opponents, who may be, for example, attorneys in private practice, may
have no similar interest in seeing to it that a particular decision was published. Thus
the published decisions, the citable decisions, might give an unfair and biased view of
the state of the law.
73. The questions of citation and precedent are at least theoretically distinct. A rule
that says a prior decision is not a precedent appears to be making an ontological or metaphysical statement about that opinion's place in the legal firmament. A rule that says that a
prior decision may not be cited simply says that the opinion may not be used in a particular
way. To avoid the metaphysics, the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice reco=ends that
the rules address the matter in terms of citation rather than precedent. STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 20.
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bate.74 Six circuits forbid citation of unreported dispositions. 75 Typically,
the reasons that the rules give for the prohibition of citation are that ( 1)
unpublished opinions do not fully disclose the court's reasoning, and (2)
unpublished opinions are not uniformly available to the parties. Often, however, the rules include exceptions that allow citation of unreported cases for
purposes of applying the doctrines of res judicata or law of the case. A representative provision is that of the Eighth Circuit: "Unpublished opinions,
since they are unreported and not uniformly available to all parties, may not
be cited or otherwise used in any proceedings before this or any other court
except when the cases are related by virtue of an identity between the parties
or the causes of action." 76
The circuits with no-citation rules have not been reluctant to enforce
them. In United States v. Kinsley, 77 the Eighth Circuit rebuked the United
States for attempting to cite an unpublished opinion:
The government relies upon our unpublished opinion in Willie J.
Vaughan v. United States of America, No. 74-1920, filed March
20, 1975. The plan for publication of opinions adopted by this
Circuit provides: "Unpublished opinions ... may not be cited or
otherwise used in any proceeding before this or any other court.
•.." We therefore decline to consider Vaughan or demonstrate
how it is plainly distinguishable from these appeals. 78
The Sixth Circuit has gone even further; it not only prohibits the citation
of unpublished opinions but also regulates their dissemination by any
publisher.79
Not all the courts prohibit citation of their unpublished opinions. The
74. The question of the constitutionality of no-citation rules bas been before the Supreme
Court twice. In Do-Right Auto Sales v. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976), the petitioners had attempted to cite an unpublished Seventh
Circuit opinion to a Seventh Circuit panel, and the panel struck the citation. The petitioners
attacked the circuit's no-citation rule 35 on first amendment and equal protection grounds.
The Supreme Court, in a one paragraph opinion, denied a motion for leave to file petitions
for writs of mandamus and prohibition.
The Seventh Circuit's no-citation rule was also attacked in Browder v. Director, 434 U.S.
257 (1978), rev'g 534 F.2d 331 (1976). Certiorari was granted on four questions in Browder,
one of which challenged rule 35. Browder v. Director, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977). The Court's
opinion, however, did not mention the no-citation problem.
Do-Right and Browder are discussed more completely in Unreported Decisions, supra note
41, at 142-43.
75. District of Columbia, D.C. Cm. R 8(f); First, 1ST Cm. R. 14 and Plan for Publication
of Opinions, 1ST Cm. R app. B; Sixth 6rn Cm. R 11; Seventh, 7rn CJR. R. 35(b)(2)(iv);
Eighth, Plan for the Publication of Opinions, 8rn CIR. R. app., para. 3; Ninth, 9rn Cm. R. 21(c),
76. Plan for the Publication of Opinions, 8rn Cm. R. app., para. 3.
77. 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1975).
78. Id. at 670 n.lO. See also United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1974).
79. 6rn Cm.. R 11 provides:
Unpublished Decisions. Decisions of this court designated as not for publication
should never be cited to this court or in any material prepared for this court. No
&uch decision should be published by any publisher unless the rule [rule 11] is quoted
at a prominent place on the first page of the decision so published.
The limited publication/no-citation rules have been attacked as curtailing freedom of expression. See note 74 supra; note 158 infra. If these standard provisions raise first amendment
difficulties, a fortiori the Sixth Circuit's rule is objectionable.
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Third and Fifth Circuits have no rules at all on the question.80 The procedures of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits are sufficiently unusual and sophisticated to warrant special attention. The Fourth Circuit has indicated that
in the absence of unusual circumstances it will not cite its own unpublished
dispositions.81 Furthermore, citation of such opinions by counsel is disfavored.82 In special circumstances, however, citation is permitted.
If counsel believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished disposition
has precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case and
that there is no published opinion that would serve as well, such
disposition may be cited if counsel serves a copy thereof on all
other parties in the case and on the court. Such service may be
accomplished by including a copy of the disposition in an appendix
to the brief.83

The Tenth Circuit does not undertake to refrain from citing its own
opinion, nor does it disfavor their citation by attorneys. Its entire statement
on the question reads as follows: "Unpublished opinions, although unreported and not uniformly available to all of the parties, can nevertheless
be cited, if relevant, in proceedings before this or any other court. Counsel
citing same shall serve a copy of the unpublished opinion upon opposing
counsel." 84 The Tenth Circuit has added a fillip to its procedures that does
much to counter the argument that citation of unpublished opinions should
be prohibited because not all litigants have equal access to them. The court
prepares a subject matter index of all its unpublished opinions that is widely
circulated. Subscriptions to the index85 and copies of unpublished opinions86
may be obtained at a minimal cost.

III.

THE

.ARGUMENT FOR THE RULES

The argument in favor of the limited publication and no-citation rules
has not been carefully and completely delineated. Commentators have been
content to characterize it as an argument based on judicial economy,87 although some of its other aspects have also been noted.88 Few writers in
80. While the Third Circuit has no rule expressly addressing the question of citation of
unpublished opinions, it does set out the preferred form for citation to "federal decisions
which have not been formally reported." 3D CIR. R. 21(1){A)(e)(ii).
81. 4TH Cm. R. 18(d) (i).
82. I d. 18(d) (ii).
83. Id. 18(d)(iii).
84. lOrn Cm. R. 17(c).
85. Letter from Emory G. Hatcher, Circuit Executive of the Tenth Circuit, to William M.
Richman (Aug. 24, 1977).
86. UNITBD STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THl! Tl!Nrn Cmcurr, !NDEX TO UNPUBLISHl!D
OPINIONS, JANUARY, 1976 THROUGH JUNE, 1976, cover sheet
87. See Unreported Decisions, supra note 41, at 142.
88. See, e.g., Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24 HAsTINGS
L.I. 37 (1972), in which the authors argue that limited publication also provides economies
for the bar and the law horarian; Brief in Opposition for Respondents, Do-Right Auto Sales v.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 429 U.S. 917 (1976), in which it is
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this area, however, have paid careful attention to the structure of the arguN
ment. The result has been that proponents and opponents of the rules often
appear to be speaking and writing at cross purposes; many criticisms, for
example, appear to take the form of counterarguments or merely countervailing considerations. When the argument is reduced to its constituent parts,
it can be seen that many of these cliticisms are really attacks upon its
premises.
The structure of the argument favoring the rules is intricate. It conN
sists of two major stages. The first of these is the argument for limited
publication; the second, which draws heavily upon the first, is the argument
for the prohibition of citation.
A.

The Argument For Limited Publication

This part of the argument emphasizes the low need for full publication
and the high cost of full publication, and presumes the ability of the judges
to distinguish those cases that merit published opinions from those that do
not.
The first premise of the argument begins by noting that appellate opinN
ions in our judicial system serve two major functions, which Professor Leflar
explains succinctly:
Appellate decisions in a common law jurisdiction have two major
functions. One is to see to it that the appealed case is decided and,
it is hoped, decided correctly. This puts an end to disputes, and
achieves the great advantage which the "rule of law" has over
private warfare or dictatorial fiat as a means for settling private
disputes.
The other principal function of appellate decisions under our
system is to establish the law itself, to determine what the content
of ·the law shall be. This is the function of common law precedent,
and of the rule of stare decisis. 89
The first function of an appellate decision, which may be called the disputeN
settling function, is to dispose of litigation, correct district court and adN
ministrative agency errors, and explain the result to ·the parties and the
decisionmaker below. The second function, which may be called the lawN
making function, is to establish law, explain changes in, and interpretaN
tion of, the law to the legal and nonlegal communities, comment upon legal
urged that most of the benefits of limited publication will be lost unless citation of unpublished
opinions is prohibited. The most careful exposition of the argument appears in STANDARDS FOR
PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25.
89. Leflar, Sources of Judge-Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 319, 319 (1971). J'udge Shirley
Hufstedler of the Ninth Circuit has made the same point. Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old
Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 901, 910 (1971). See also P.
Km!ToN, REPORT TO THE .AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS ON CURTAILING ORAL AROU•
MENT, ELIMINATING OPINIONS AND REDUCING TilE VOLUME OF PUBLlSHBD OPINIONS IN TilE
UNITED STATES CoURTS OF APPEALS (1975); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts oj
Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542,
550 (1969).
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and social problems, and criticize existing legal doctrine.90 These purposes,
it should be noted, closely resemble those that the standards for publication
in the circuit rules seek to isolate.91
The first premise next notes that those opinions serving only the disputesettling function have value only to the parties in the case and the decisionmaker below; they have no value. to the legal public at large. Accordingly,
since publication of these opinions serves no general purpose, there is no
need for full publication. 92
The second premise of the argument is that full publication is excessively costly. The costs can be roughly divided between the costs of producing published opinions (judge-time, clerk-time, etc.) and the costs of
consuming published opinions (library space, research time, etc.). Because
of the increase in the workload of the courts of appeals,93 judicial attention
has focused on the costs of production. It is not surprising that when Chief
Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit sought to justify his court's one word disposition of appeals he spoke with "foreboding'' of the court's caseload.94
To handle this load, time savings must be realized. Because a judge
spends a substantial portion of his casetime on opinion writing, as distinguished from research, conference, and argument, reductions in time spent on
opinion writing could be significant.95 Those savings could result from
several factors. First, opinions that serve only the dispute-settling function
are by hypothesis of interest only to the litigants and the decisionmaker
below. Since they are already familiar with the facts of the case, the
appellate judge need not spend as much time carefully organizing and
reciting the facts-a task that would have to be accomplished in any published opinion.98 Furthermore, in a case in which only the dispute-settling
function is being served, the judge need not identify all the issues raised or
rehearse all the arguments made by each party. Citation to and discussion
of the legal principles that the parties agree are controlling can be curtailed.
90. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 2 and 3.
91. See notes 47-58 and accompanying text supra.
92. Judge Charles W. Joiner phrased the conclusions as follows:
But unlimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a burden and a threat
to a cohesive body of law. Even when the focus is confined to appellate courts, it
is plain to every lawyer, every judge, and to most law students that many opinions
are written that do not merit publication. Often, the matter decided has no potential
effect upon our knowledge of the law or its development, yet it results in a written
opinion that takes the time and energy the judges could better spend in more attentively considering and developing resolution of significant issues in other cases.
Jointer, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATUIU! 195, 195 (1972) (emphasis
supplied).
93. See notes 2-4 supra.
94. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 968-970
(5th Cir. 1970).
95. Little in the way of empirical observation of a judge's use of his time is available.
A study of seven Third Circuit judges found that 48% of "case time" (30% of total "judge
time") was spent on opinion writing. A Summary of the Third Circuit Time Study, in APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, supra note 7, at 49. The Third Circuit study, however, must be read with
ll salt shaker handy. Apart from the small number of judges involved, each judge kept track
of his own time and defined for himself the terms used in his report.
96. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 522 (testimony of Judge Robert A Sprecher of the
Seventh Circuit).
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In short, the judge need not acquit his legal erudition simply to inform the

parties how he arrived at his resu1t. 97 Finally, a great deal of technical production time is saved by non-publication. Proofreading and cite-checking
of galleys, for example, are time consuming tasks which do not even arguably
improve the judicial product.98
The cost to society of opinion publication extends beyond the burden
on the judges, for there are also costs associated with opinion consumption.
The most obvious of these is the financial cost of publication and storage
of the volumes. Private lawyers, even in large law firms, find it difficult to
stock the burgeoning volumes of case law. Public law libraries and the
libraries of governmental agencies can accommodate the surfeit, but the expense for the public is large. Less obvious but perhaps more significant is
the extra research time that a greater volume of published case law requires.
This cost must be borne by the bench as well as the bar. The Advisory
Council on Appellate Justice phrased the problem aptly:
The burden on the lawyer is commensurate with that of the judge
in terms of accountability in preparing his cases. The endless
search for factual analogy requires immense expenditure of time
and funds that can resu1t in reliance upon quirks rather than upon
careful rationalization and application of the developing law. 99
A corollary logistical cost arising from the increased number of volumes
and the "endless search for factual analogy" is the cost of developing and
maintaining increasingly comprehensive and sophisticated law finding devices.1oo
Finally, proponents of limited publication fear that full publication will
result in a "threat to a cohesive body of law." 101 Apparently the fear is that
97. Forceful statements of this particular argument appear in HRUSKA REPORT, supra note
3, at 50; STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 18.
98. The argument that reducing the number of published opinions can considerably decrease the amount of time spent on opinion writing and thus increase judicial output has at
least 'ome empirical confirmation. Testifying before the Hruska Commission, Judge Sprecher
of the Seventh Circuit reported:
For the first eleven months of 1973, the Seventh Circuit published opinions in 223
cases constituting 38% of its appeals determined on the merits and disposed of 367
appeals or 62% by unpublished order. This is undoubtedly the principal reason why
in calendar year 1973 the Seventh Circuit for the first time since 1966 terminated more
appeals than were filed. The court docketed 1,163 appeals and terminated 1,191
appeals in 1973. Terminations increased by almost 20% in 1973.
He went on to add:
While we are proud that for the first time in seven years we reduced rather than increased our backlog of appeals, we are particularly pleased because we believe that
this was accomplished without sacrificing the vital elements of an appeal or disappointing the normal expectations of the bar and public of what constitutes a fair con'ideration of a case by an appellate tribunal.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 521. In addition, since 1973 the percentage of appeals disposed
of by the courts of appeals in published opinions has declined by over a fifth-from 48.4%
to 37.2%. 1973-77 PUBLICATION PLANS REPORTS, supra note 34, at 2.
99. STANDARDS OF PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 7.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. at 6.
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as volume increases, so does prolixity and confusion. Central principles may
no longer be discernible amidst the crush of decisions.
In sum, the argument for limited publication rules contends that full
publication is both wasteful and unnecessary because publication of opinions
that serve only the dispute-settling function creates significant extra costs and
answers no pressing need. At this point, proponents of limited publication conclude that the plans adopted by the circuit courts are justified.
That conclusion, however, is premature. While limited publication may be
desirable in some respects, it does not follow that the existing circuit rules
are justified. The deficiency in the reasoning comes from ignoring the fact
that each rule, in addition to stating the desideratum of limited publication,
provides a mechanism for reaching that goal. The judge must decide whether
each opinion warrants publication. Though that decision can of course be
made at any time, it seems clear that if significant judiciaP-02 cost savings are
to be realized, the decision not to publish must be made at or prior to the
time writing begins. Thus, in order to reach the conclasion that the rules
are justified, an additional or third premise is required. The suppressed
premise is that appellate judges, at or before the time of writing, can, and in
good faith will, determine whether an opinion will serve the dispute-settling
function only or the lawmaking function as well.103 It is this suppressed
premise (which ·this Article will address shortly) that is the proper -target of
much of the criticism directed at the limited publication rules.

B.

The No-citation Argument

The second major segment of the argument for the circuit rules concerns the prohibition of citation. This segment of the argument consists in
turn of two parts: first, the purpose of -the limited publication rules would
be frustrated if citation of unpublished opinions were permitted; second,
citation of unpublished opinions would unfairly advantage certain litigants
over others.104
102. A later decision would still result, however, in cost savings to the consumers of the
opinions.
103. Some writers have expressly recognized this premise. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 11-12.
104. An additional argument has been made for the no-citation rules. The text does not
treat it, because it is essentially a frivolous contention. The argument is that unpublished
circuit court opinions should not be cited because it is impossible to "shepardize" them, that
is, to determine whether they have been reversed or overruled. See STANDARDS FOR PUBLICA·
TION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 19. The problem of reversal is easily handled.
The only judicial bodies that can reverse a court of appeals opinion are that court en bane and
the Supreme Court. In either case, the reversing court could retroactively order the publication of the reversed opinion; Shephard's Citator would then note the original opinion and its
reversal.
The overruling problem is not much more difficult. First, it should be quite unlikely, if
judges are selecting for publication with any degree of care, that an unpublished opinion
would later be overruled. If it were overruled in a published opinion (all circuit court standards arguably prohibit overruling in an unpublished opinion) Shepard's Citator would pick up
the case reference in the published opinion. At that point, Shepard's would simply add to its
volumes a very short section on unpublished opinions by circuit. Presumably, the citations to
unpublished opinions would be few, the overrulings even fewer; and the extra burden o~
Shepard's would be small indee\1.
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It will be recalled that the purpose of the limited publication rules is
to lower the costs of producing and consuming judicial opinions.10G This
purpose, it is claimed, would be systematically frustrated by permitting citation of unpublished opinions. For example, one of the principal arguments
for the limited publication rules is that judges writing only for the parties
and the court below need not fully expound all of the facts and arguments.
If citation of unpublished opinions were permitted, however, judges would
no longer be satisfied with this limited exposition, fearing that careless
words or omitted facts might cause difficulty later on. The savings in judgetime would thus be lost.106 Judge Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit gave this
argument an interesting twist in his testimony before the Hruska Commission.107 He noted that distinguishing cases and making close factual comparisons are critical for purposes of stare decisis but that it is impossible to
engage seriously in these endeavors if facts have not been fully and carefully
exposed:
Finally, and I think this is really the crux of the question of citation, personally I would think that if a no-citation rule did not go
hand in hand with a no publication rule, I would feel that we should
do away with the no-publication rule and go back to the old full
publication rule, and that is because of the question of stare decisis.
I think we would find that our very delicate principles of
stare decisis, which are the genius of the common law ••. , would
break down completely if you would get into the procedure of
citing cases that did not fully explore the facts . . . .
In other words, the distinguishing of cases is a hallmark of
stare decisis, and if we were not able to do that, we would find ourselves citing cases that really had no relevance at all ....108
Furthermore, permitting citation would diminish the savings in the costs
of consuming judicial opinions. Several supporters of the no-citation rule
have made the point that if citation were permissible, private publishers
would enter the market and systematically publish officially unpublished
opinions.109 Even if private publication did not occur, careful judges and
105. See notes 89-101 and accompanying text supra.
106. This argument recurs throughout the literature. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR PUBLICA•
TION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 18. A succinct statement of it appears in
Joiner, supra note 92, at 199.
107. Hearings, supra note 1, at 532 (testimony of Judge Robert A. Sprecher of the
Seventh Circuit).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Hruska Report, supra note 3, at 51:
The Commission is, of course, aware of the problems which result from nonpublication. Perhaps the thorniest involves the question whether or not to allow unpublished opinions to be cited as precedent. To allow litigants to cite opinions
which the court has designated as "not for publication" invites publication by private
publishers, thus defeating the basic purposes of the program.
In his testimony before the Commission, Edward H. Hickey, president of the Bar Association
of the Seventh Circuit voiced the same concern:
If unpublished opinions can be cited, publication in some format will surely result.
The major publishers of federal court opinions-West Publishing Company, Com-
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practitioners110 would feel obliged to monitor and index unpublished opinions,
and libraries would inevitably provide shelf space for them. Thus, the substantial savings in the costs of consuming judicial opinions would be lost.
The second no-citation argument is that prohibition of citation is necessary to prevent unfairness. The argument is based on the belief that
litigants will have differential access to unpublished opinions.111 Permitting
citation would unjustly favor those lawyers with sufficient resources to monitor
and index unpublished opinions. The small practitioner clearly could not
afford that expense. The argument becomes even more persuasive when
considering large corporate or institutional litigants-the United States Attorney's Offices, for example. These litigants have large legal staffs and
relatively specialized interests and can therefore easily find and catalogue all
unpublished opinions of interest to them. A partial solution is found in the
rules of the Fourth112 and Tenth Circuits,113 which permit citation of unpublished opinions if a copy is served on opposing counsel. These rules do
not entirely eliminate the problem, however, for the litigant with special
knowledge of the unpublished opinions in an area would still be able to use
an opinion if it favored him and withhold it if it did not, thereby retaining
considerable advantage over his opponent.114
C.

The Schema115

The argument for the limited publication and no-citation rules is quite
complex. The following schema attempts to reduce it to manageable form
merce Clearing House, Prentice-Hall and the Bureau of National Affairs-have thus
far refrained from publishing Seventh Circuit's unpublished opinions. All of these
publishers have, however, commented that if unpublished opinions become citable,
a market for them will develop, and publication will undoubtedly begin, thereby
frustrating the purpose of the non-citation rule.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 452 (Footnotes omitted). Apparently, there is real cause for concern. In California, which for a time had a limited publication sYStem but did not forbid
citation, private publishers did, in fact, offer unpublished opinion services. Id. at 476 (letter
from Dwight D. Opperman, President of West Publishing Company, to Chief Judge Swygert of
the Seventh Circuit).
110. One writer asks the troubling question: "Can a lawyer be criticized for negligence
in failing to discover an unpublished opinion which, if known, might have won a case which
he lost?" Russell, Selectivity of Judicial Opinions-by Judge or Official Reporter, 20 BROOKLYN
BARRISTBR 171, 175 (1969).
111. This argument is probably the most frequently mentioned aspect of the entire limited
publication, no-citation debate. The following sources are a representative sample of the debate.
United States v. Joly, 493 F.2d 672, 676 (2d Cir. 1974); Jones v. Superintendent, 465 F.2d
1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972); STANDAI!DS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note
25, at 19; HRusKA. REPORT, supra note 3, at 51; Hearings, supra note 1, at 487 (testimony of
Irvin B. Chame, former President, Bar Association of the Seventh Circuit); Seligson & Warnlof,
supra note 88, at 52.
112. 4TH CIR. R 18(d)(iii).
113. lOTH CIR. R 17(c).
114. See STANDAI!DS FOR LIMmNG PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at
19; Seligson & Warnlof, supra note 88, at 52.
115. We do not wish to suggest that this schema is in the form of a valid natural deduction. It is not. The no-citation argument is not strictly a deduction at all. Rather sections
A and B are each short-hand statements of a deduction. We have chosen this form of exposition not because it will satisfy formal logicians, but simply because it is easier to speak
about and critique an argument whose parts are somehow denominated.
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and thereby provide a framework for assessing criticisms of the limited
publication and no-citation rules.

I.

THE ARGUMENT FOR LIMITED PUBLICATION
First Premise:

Not all appellate opinions need be published.
A.

Appellate opinions serve two basic tasks:
1. The dispute-settling function-they decide
cases, correct lower courts or agencies, and
explain results to the parties.
2. The lawmaking function-they make law
and inform the legal consumer.

B.

Opinions that perform only the first task have
value not to the public at large but only to the
parties and the court or agency below.

Second Premise: Publication of all appellate opinions is excessively
costly.

A.

The Costs of Production
1. The courts of appeals are overcrowded.
2. A significant portion of a judge's time is
spent in opinion writing (as opposed to
preparation for decision).
3. Limitation of publication to opinions that
serve the lawmaking function leads to
substantial savings of time and effort:
a. It is not necessary to fully recite facts
or arguments.
b. Prose need not be as polished, nor
scholarship as thorough, as in a published opinion.
c. Production tasks, e.g., proofreading
galleys, are avoided.

B.

The Costs of Legal Consumption
The costs of consuming published opinions
include:
1. The costs associated with expanding law
libraries.
2. The costs of extra research time.
3. The threat posed by prolixity to the cohesiveness of the common law.
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Third Premise:

Before writing an opinion appellate judges can, and
in good faith will, determine whether it will implicate
the court's lawmaking function.

Therefore:

Limited publication rules are justified.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR NO-CITATION

First:

Cost savings associated with limited publication would
be lost if opinions could be cited.
A.

Savings in production costs would vanish; judges
would feel bound to draft opinions for a broader
audience if they could be cited.

B. Savings in consumption costs would vanish.
1. Private publishers would publish these opinions
if a market existed.
2. Even if private publication did not occur,
lawyers and judges would feel bound to research
unpublished opinions.

Second:

Unfairness would result, because unpublished opinions
are more available to some litigants than others.

Therefore:

Unpublished opinions should not be citable.
IV.

THE

OTHER SIDE

The argument in favor of the limited publication and no-citation rules is
vulnerable to two types of attack. First, although the premises of that
argument, if accepted, compel the conclusion that the rules are justified,
these premises themselves are subject to challenge. Second, two significant
counterarguments can be advanced directly against the rules. Both types of
attack will be developed below.

A.

The Attack on Limited Publication Premises
Premise One: Not All Opinions Need to be Published.

(a) Two Types of Appellate Opinions. While the theoretical distinction between the dispute-settling and lawmaking functions is plausible, it is
subject to the charge that it is unworkable, that in practice the distinction
is too difficult to make. That attack is more appropriately directed to the
third premise of the syllogism, however, and will be discussed below.116
(b) Value to Whom? The second part of the first premise asserts
that opinions serving only to settle disputes have no value to the public at
116. See text accompanying notes 128-41, infra.
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large. That assertion ignores, however, the value of accumulation of decisions in an area. First, the weight of precedent on a point of law hardens
it, making it more difficult to overturn. The sheer number of affirmations
allows attorneys to rely on the stability of a doctrine with greater confidence.U1 Several cases reaffirming a once controversial point would assure
the cautious practitioner where one case would not. Second, later cases help
flesh out a precedent, help make it more understandable. These later elaborations are important even though they do not make law, because the sweep
of a group of cases makes it easier to understand the principles involved.118
Such fleshing out by application of principle to different facts is vital to
common-law adjudication.119 In addition, the accumulation of a large number of routine decisions on a discrete point may suggest to courts, practitioners, or scholars that problems exist in that area, problems that may require doctrinal reform.12o
Publication of dispute-settling opinions also has value beyond the effect
on the quality of precedent, because publication-that is, availability to the
public-furthers an important institutional goal: maintaining the appearance
that justice has been done. Publication is a signal to litigants and observers
that a court has nothing to hide, that the quality of its work in a case is
open for public inspection. At a time when society places an increasingly
high value on openness and visibility of decisionmaking,121 it seems incongruous that non-publication rules should be permitted to obscure the
workings of our courts.122

Premise Two: Costs of Full Publication
(a) Costs of Production. The first part of Premise Two relies on the
heavy caseload of the courts of appeals and the belief that preparation of an
opinion for publication involves significantly more judicial resources than
does preparation of an unpublished opinion. It is indisputable that the
present workload of the courts of appeals creates serious problems. Nor can
it be doubted that preparation of an opinion for publication takes time. The
Third Circuit time study, for example, found that close to half of a judge's
"case time" was devoted to the preparation of opinions.128 Furthermore,
117. For a summary of the effect of precedent on private ordering, see H. HART & A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 587 (tentative eel. 1958).
118. The rules of several circuits provide for publication when a case involves application
of a settled principle to a novel set of facts. See District of Columbia Plan, supra note 34,
para. e; Plan for the Publication of Opinion, 8rn CIR. R. app., para. 4(c).
119. K. LLEWELLYN, Aftenvord to THE BRAMBLE BUSH 160 (2d ed. 1957), is the classic
exposition of the view that a precedent stands only for the proposition that subsequent cases
say it stands for ("The Law of Leeways"). See also Comment, A Snake in the Path of tluJ
Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 PITT L. REv. 309, 332-335 [hereinafter
cited as Comment] for several examples of unpublished opinions in the Sevenili Circuit that
"fiesh out" principles enumerated in published decisions.
120. See text accompanying notes 178-79 infra.
121. See, e.g., Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
122. This consideration seems all the more pressing witll regard to the judiciary-the least
vist'ble, least understood branch of our government.
123. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
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there is evidence that productivity in courts that have adopted limited publication rules has increased, perhaps significantly.124 On the other hand, while
the link between limited publication and increased productivity seems intuitively correct, it has yet to be established by careful study.125 Since the
existence of that correlation would appear to be readily verifiable, it should
be empirically established before too much reliance is placed on what is at
present an untested hypothesis.
(b) Consumption Costs. The second part of Premise Two adduces
three costs incurred in the consumption of proliferating caselaw: increased
library costs, increased research costs, and diminished cohesiveness of the
law. It seems indisputable that opinion proliferation exacts a toll in research
time and in library budgets. While new methods to cope with the load have
been developed,l 26 their high costs and lag time for implementation make it
unlikely that they will signilicantly alter the picture in the foreseeable future.
The notion that full publication will damage the cohesiveness of the
law has intuitive appeal: inability of the bench and bar to deal with "too
much, case law will result in an amorphous mass leading to confusion and
inconsistency. Central principles will not be readily discernible in this mass
and thus will be lost to those seeking to trace the seamless web.
It is difficult to understand, however, how merely cumulative opinions
threaten the cohesiveness of the common law; they should, if anything, make
research and discernment of principle easier, since there will be more cases
elaborating a principle, and some of those cases will be more recent as wel1.12'1'
We suspect that the cohesiveness argument reflects a longing for an earlier,
simpler day when an attorney supposedly could practice out of Blackstone
and a few volumes of state reports. Such a day-if it ever existed-is long
gone; complexity, like inconsistency, will not vanish by sweeping it under the
rug.

Premise Three: Early Prediction
The third and generally unarticulated premise of the non-publication
argument asserts that judges can, and in good faith will, predict early in the
124. Judge Sprecher testified that following the adoption of the Seventh Circuit's nonpublication rule his annual opinion production rose from 45 to 75, Hearings, supra note 1, at
534. See also note 98 supra for additional evidence that time savings have been recorded after
adoption of the limited publication and no-citation rules.
125. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
126. Librazy storage will be aided by microfilm and, eventually, computer retrieval systems. Research will also be aided by computer systems such as Lexis and Westlaw. See
generally Sprowl, Computer-Assisted Legal Research-An Analysis of Full-Text Document
Retrieval Systems, Particularly the Lexis System, 1976 AM. B. FoUNDATION REsEARCH J. 175;
Sprowl, The Westlaw System-A Different Approach to Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 16
JURIMETRICS J. 142 (1976).
127. To be sure, more cases will make it harder to Shepardize; again, however, that
process will reveal the accumulation of precedent and how recently a given case has been
reaffirmed-clearly useful things to know. One problem involving Shepardization that will
increase with complete publication is the difficulty of tracing precedent that has been cited
needlessly. The useless string citation is a problem quite independent of the publication debate.
For a discussion of "strings," see Smith, The Current Opinions of the Supreme Court of
Arkansas: A Study in Craftsmanship, 1 ARK. L. REv. 89, 96 (1947).
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game whether the opinion in a case will merit publication. That the prediction be made before the opinion is written is crucial to the argument; otherwise, little saving of judicial resources will occur.
From the beginning there has been some skepticism concerning judges'
ability to distinguish correctly between dispute-settling and lawmaking opinions. Justice Stevens has observed that an opinion's author is uniquely illsuited to make such a distinction.
[A] !lJle which authorizes any court to censor the future citation of
its own opinions or orders rests on a false premise. Such a rule
assumes that an author is a reliable judge of the quality and importance of his own work product. If I need authority to demonstrate the invalidity of that assumption, I refer you to a citizen of
Illinois who gave a brief talk in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania that he
did not expect to be long remembered. Judges are the last persons
who should be authorized to detennine which of their decisions
should be long remembered.12s
Others testifying before the Hruska Commission had no philosophical dispute with the rules but expressed serious doubts about whether they would
work in practice.129
A good deal of evidence suggests that these suspicions are well-founded,
i.e., that many lawmaking opinions are in fact going unpublished. In the
Fourth Circuit, for example, a challenge to Virginia's voter registration laws
was disposed of in a one-paragraph unpublished opinion.180 An analogous
case from the Fifth Circuit has already been mentioned;181 there the court
reversed a district court reapportionment order in a one word opinion.
Similarly, when the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court's refusal to order
a public mass transit agency to accept advertising messages for a citizens'
group, the opinion went unpublished even though it sparked a seventeen
page dissent.182 And the Ninth Circuit declined to publish a decision that
included an important and novel construction of an arbitration clause in a
128. Remarks of Justice Stevens, illinois State Bar Association's Centennial Dinner, Springfield, illinois (Jan. 22, 1977), quoted In Brief for Amicus Curiae Chicago Council of Lawyers,
Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Amicus
Brief].
129. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 487-88 (testimony of Irvin B. Chame, former
President of the Bar Association of the Seventh Circuit); id. at 802 (testimony of Professor
Martha Field of the University of Pennsylvania Law School).
130. Justice v. Mahan, No. 77-1616 (4th Cir. May 9, 1977).
131. See note 46 supra (discussing Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191 (1972)).
132. Impeach Nixon Comm. v. Buck, 498 F.2d 37 (7th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 419
U.S. 891 (1974). Publication came only after reversal and remand by the Supreme Court
and after the Seventh Circuit's subsequent remand to the district court, Impeach Nixon Comm.
v. Buck, 506.F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1974) (table) . .Another example of oversight in the Seventh
Circuit is Bach v. Bensinger, 504 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974). Bach started life as an unpublished order and was subsequently published upon request by counsel, following the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, 418 U.S. 910 (1974). Bach held that a prisoner is constitutionally entitled to be present during the opening of mail addressed to him. Both of these
cases are discussed in Amicus Brief, supra note 128.

HeinOnline -- 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1192 1978

1978]

NON-PRECEDENTIAL PRECEDENT

1193

collective bargaining agreement.133 These cases of suppressed precedent are
included by way of example only; they do not exhaust the literature134 or the
other available data.135
The existence of inconsistency between unpublished opinions and published law and among unpublished opinions is also evidence that Premise
Three is falst?.136 Opinions that create inconsistencies must be considered
lawmaking opinions; by definition, they depart noticeably from the established course of decision. Such opinions should always be published, and
as might be expected, every circuit's plan arguably requires their publication.187 Yet instances of inconsistency involving unpublished opinions per133. Local 7, Tile Helpers & Finishers v. Clervi Marble Co., No. 73-1409, (9th Cir. Nov.
7, 1974), discussed in Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal
Justice?, 61 A.B.A. J. 1224, 1226 (1975). The arbitration clause included the words "may
be submitted to a neutral arbitrator." In light of the fact that the agreement contained a
strict no-strike clause, the court held that the quoted language imposed a mandatory duty to
arbitrate notwithstanding the use of the precatory word "may."
134. See, e.g., Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST.
B. J. 386 (1973) (numerous illustrations from California). The author found suppressed
precedents in several areas: eminent domain, id. at 436-41; discovery, id. at 440; Uniform
Commercial Code, id. at 441. See also Unreported Decisions, supra note 41, at 136-38
discussing an unreported Fourth Circuit decision that gave retroactive effect to Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and descnoing the treatment of that Fourth Circuit decision in
the district courts); Comment, supra note 119, at 324-27, 330-32 (discussing several Seventh
Circuit cases).
135. We have randomly examined 100 unpublished Fourth Circuit opinions. Several appear to merit publication, i.e., they seem to be opinions fairly characterized as lawmaking.
E.g., United States v. Shaver, No. 77-1496 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1977) (rejecting a motion to
disqualify a judge in a bank robbery case on the ground that the judge was a stockholder in
a bank); Harris v. Hartman, No. 77-1566 (4th Cir. Oct. 31, 1977) (simple negligence resulting in loss of propertY does not constitute a federal cause of action); Justice v. Mahan,
No. 77-1616 (4th Cir. May 9, 1977), discussed in text accompanying note 130 supra. None of
these cases cited controlling Fourth Circuit precedent. The inference is strong that these are
thus lawmaking opinions. The alternative hypothesis is that there is relevant Fourth Circuit
precedent that the court failed to cite. If that hypothesis is correct, it may be that no
"precedents" are being suppressed; but it is fair to conclude that the craftsmanship of unpublished opinions has slipped to unacceptable levels.
In three other cases, the court cited its own earlier unpublished opinions (somewhat odd
in light of 4TH Cm. R. 18 (d)(i), see note 81, and accompanying text supra): United States
v. Montgomery, No. 77-1651 (4th Cir., Oct. 20, 1977); Powell v. Currey, No. 77-1486 (4th
Cir., Oct. 20, 1977); and Smith v. Davis, No. 77-1502 (4th Cir., Sept. 15, 1977). The Smith
opinion, not content with mere citation to an unpublished opinion, reversed and remanded to
the trial court, and referred that court to the earlier opinion as an adequate statement of the
elements needed to maintain a cause of action! Id., slip op. at 3, n.l.
But cf. Remarks of John P. Frank before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference 8-9
(July 29, 1976) (reviewed 50 unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions and found only two with
which he was uncomfortable).
136. Much of the attack on Premise Three, relying as it does upon inconsistency and
suppressed precedent, is also relevant to the counterarguments. See text accompanying notes
160-70 infra. The two phenomena are used, however, for different purposes in the two discussions. Here they are employed to suggest that Premise Three is false. Later, their purpose
is to show that the limited publication rules have pernicious consequences that may counterbalance their expediency.
137. Several circuits have standards that specifically require publication of any opinion
involving an inconsistency. See District of Columbia Circuit Plan, supra note 34; 4TH Cm. R.
18(a)(v); Plan for the Publication of Opinion, 8TH Cm. R app., para. 4(b); lOTH Cm. R.
17(d)(l). The plans of the remaining circuits all include either (1) a criterion that calls for
publication when an opinion establishes a new rule or alters an existing rule or (2) a criterion
that calls for publication when an opinion has precedential, institutional, or jurisprudential
value. See Table II, page 1208 infra. An opinion that is inconsistent with other law published
or unpublished, arguably satisfies these criteria.
'
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sist.188 Although there has been no systematic study of the frequency of
inconsistency in a large number of unpublished decisions in a single jurisdiction, evidence from the Ninth Circuit130 and from the California system140
does suggest that inconsistency among unpublished opinions is not unusual.141
Each such instance constitutes evidence that judges cannot, at the time of
writing, correctly distinguish between lawmaking and dispute-settling opinions,
i.e., each instance demonstrates that Premise Three is false.
B.

The Attack on the No-Citation Arguments
Argument One: Loss of Cost Savings.

The first no-citation argument asserts that the substantial cost savings
associated with non-publication-for both judges and legal consumerswould vanish if citation were permitted. This argument seems fairly secure.142
It should be noted, however, that if judges and attorneys should choose to
use unpublished opinions/43 even though they cannot be cited, the savings
from non-publication will be lessened. Indeed, if enough use is made of
those opinions the extra cost of collecting, indexing, and researching them (an
"extra" in that cost reductions due to mass distribution cannot be realized)
may offset the apparent savings attendant on the non-publication decision.
138. Inconsistency, of course, is no stranger to published opinions. The point here, however, is that inconsistent decisions merit publication. The counterarguments, see notes 160·64
and accompanying text infra, examine whether non-publication helps cause inconsistency.
139. See Remarks of John P. Frank, supra note 135, at 11-12; Gardner, Ninth Circuit's
Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A. J. 1224, 1224 (1975) (conflict between published and unpublished opinions involving application of a statutory penalty for improper withholding of a deduction from a seaman's wage not expressly permitted by law.);
Weisgall, Stop, Search and Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F.L.
REv. 219, 253-54 (1974) (discussion of conflict between published and unpublished opinions
on the question of the weight given previous arrests).
There is some evidence of inconsistency from the Third Circuit as well. See Krolick
Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Rev. Bd., 558 F.2d 685, 689 (3d Cir. 1977), in which the court
indicated that an unpublished opinion was flatly inconsistent with prior published law.
140. Kanner, supra note 134, discusses a number of inconsistencies among decisions of
the California Court of Appeals. His list includes eminent domain cases, id. at 436; interpretation of public contracts (is it an issue of law?), id. at 442; and discovery procedures, id. at 440.
141. It should not be surprising that few writers have collected examples of inconsistency
or suppressed precedent. Production of such evidence requires, first, access to unpublished
opinions and, second, sufficiently detailed knowledge of the law of the jurisdiction (published
and unpublished) to determine whether an opinion is remarkable in virtue of its novelty or its
conflict with other case law. Often, only the genuine expert can locate such evidence. See
Kanner, supra note 134, at 436. Finally, detection of inconsistency or suppressed precedent
might require examination of the briefs and record in the case, because the brevity of an unpublished opinion could obscure its rationale.
In light of these difficulties, one thorough effort deserves mention. A Comment in the
University of Pittsburgh Law Review reports the results of an examination of the unpublished
orders of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Of the 150 unreported orders issued in that
period, 15% were found that should have been published, i.e., 15% of the Seventh Circuit's
orders were believed to be instances of suppressed precedent. See Comment, supra note 119.
This is the sort of careful effort that will ultimately determine whether suppressed precedent
and inconsistency are statistically significant phenomena.
142. See, e.g., Letter from Dwight D. Opperman, President of the West Publishing Company, to Chief Judge Swygert of the Seventh Circuit, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 1, nt
476: "In the absence of such a [no-citation] rule • • ., somebody will end up publishing
them." Unpublished opinions of course often find their way into "specialized reporters."
143. See text accompanying notes 149-57 infra.
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Argument Two: Resulting Unfairness. The second no-citation argument is rooted in the concept of fairness: to permit citation of unpublished
opinions would result in prejudice to those litigants who do not have ready
access to them; therefore, citation must be limited. There are two responses
to the unfairness argument, responses with significantly different implications
for the non-publication arguinent.
(a) Unequal Access is Not Unfair. Courts often use materials that are
not widely available. The legislative history of statutes and administrative
regulations, for example, can be quite difficult to track down, especially in
geographic areas where depository libraries are scarce. Yet courts freely use
legislative history144-examining such relatively unavailable sources as committee reports, conference reports, and superseded agency regulations-with
only an occasional voice raised in protest.145 Other examples of limited
access research and law-finding tools can be enumerated. Special interest
law reporters,146 too expensive for small practitioners or even small bar
libraries, may provide invaluable aid in gathering and organizing unreported
district court opinions147 and the work of administrative agencies. In addition, well-heeled litigators148 have access to even more sophisticated research
tools, including computerized retrieval systems, that most cannot afford.
These examples suggest that concern over limited access to unpublished
opinions may be overstated. If permitting citation of unpublished opinions
is unfair, it is not significantly more unfair than other well-established
practices.
(b) Unfairness is an Unavoidable Result of Limited Publication. Even
if it be ultimately determined that unequal access to governing decisional
law cannot be tolerated, it is nevertheless far from clear that no-citation rules
remedy the problem.149 Such rules restrict but do not eliminate effective use
of unpublished opinions. Compilations of those opinions will still be made
by institutional litigants, such as United States Attorneys or Public Defenders,
and by wealthy private litigants. They will do so, because those with
144. Among the more famous uses of legislative history in the Supreme Court are Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
145. Justice Jackson, concurring in United States v. Public Utils. Co='n, 345 U.S. 295,
319 (1953), made this point with some vigor.
146. Federal taxation law, with its own reporters and citators and its reliance on materials
not generally available (revenue rulings and legislative history), for example, surely provides
the best illustration. But the problem exists in all fields, even those in which the litigants might
not be as wealthy as many of the litigants in the tax field. Public interest and environmental
lawyers, for example, rely on specialized services.
147. Indeed, the separate problem of use of unreported district court opinions is never
discussed. We believe them to be influential, not just with the judge who authored them but
throughout the district as welL
148. One such litigator, Francis R. Kirkham, a member of the Hruska Commission, remarked during that Commission's hearings that he was "terrified in [his] practice of law because [he] cannot move without a computer. • • ." Hearings, supra note 1, at 612.
149. The argument here is basically an argument by dile=a. Proponents of the nocitation rules must either admit that unequal access is not unfair, in which case there is no
need for the rules, or contend that unequal access is unfair, in which case the rules do not
provide a sufficient remedy.
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access to unreported decisions will enjoy a considerable advantage over
their opponents, even in the face of a strictly enforced no-citation rule.1G0
Several factors contribute to this advantage. The first involves planning.
When making decisions about initiating litigation, settling claims, or appealing unfavorable results, an attorney could profit greatly from reading all that
a court has produced in a single area. Even if no lawmaking opinions were
to slip through the court's screening process, the sheer number and recentness of opinions that serve only the dispute-settling function would be relevant to those decisions. If, on the other hand, a significant number of lawmaking opinions go unpublished, the advantages to the sophisticated litigant
are even more pronounced. Without citing the relevant unpublished opinion,
an attorney aware of such an opinion could use its arguments, exact language,
and hypotheticals. He would know which of the court's published opinions
were considered relevant by its citations. Finally, if inconsistency exists between a court's published and unpublished work, it would be of great practical value to know what the court does as well as what it says. In sum, the
unequal access argument can be turned on its head. Pursued to its logical
conclusion it is not an argument for no-citation rules but rather a powerful
argument against the whole notion of limited publication.
A little reflection on the use of unreported decisions by the judiciary
itself reinforces this point. First of all, district court judges receive and read
the unpublished decisions.151 When faced with a case similar to an unreported decision he has recently read, the careful judge will surely consider,
but not cite, the opinion. He will do this because he knows the "law" of
his circuit and feels bound to follow it.152 His years of common-law training
in the force of stare decisis are not so easily swept aside by a new local rule.
The interaction between knowledgeable counsel and judge when an important
unpublished decision comes up must present a strange spectacle as they
attempt to discuss (in the manner of not discussing) the forbidden fruit.
150. This argument was made quite forcefully by Willard J. Lassers in his testimony before the Hruska Commission. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 557. See also Amicus Brief,
supra note 128, at 16-17; Kanner, supra note 134, at 390.
The proponents of the no-citation rule have not been naive about this problem; indeed,
it was anticipated in STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS, supra note 25, at 19:
Nothing proposed in this report will overcome the discrepancy that exists today and
vlill continue to exist between lawyers contioually litigating specific types of matters
before a court, and the lawyer who only occasionally appears on such matters. The
first lawyer may have a better idea as to the way the judges think and the likelihood
of success. We believe this proposal does not accentuate this problem and perhaps
minimizes it by preventing the knowledgeable lawyer from citiog the unpublished
opinions to the court.
See text followiog note 157 infra for a counterargument to the last sentence quoted.
151. Some circuits, e.g., the Fourth and the Ninth, circulate all of their unpublished
opinions to all circuit and district judges in their circuit as a matter of course; others, e.g,, the
Seventh, apparently circulate the unpublished opinions only to the circuit judges in their circuit
and the district judge below; still others, e.g., the First and the Sixth circulate some but not
all of their unpublished opioions to all circuit and district judges in their circuit. The source
of this information is personal letters from the clerks, circuit executives, and chief judges of
the several circuits to the authors.
152. Or he may follow the non-publication decision due to a dislike of being r~verscd,
The efiect is the same.
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On occasion, an especially frank district judge has denied himself the pleas~
ures of the game and admitted indulgence.153
Similarly, the circuit courts know how they have disposed of cases in
the past.154 If Karl Llewellyn was right in his suggestion that following
precedent is a basic human urge/ 55 then it is natural that the court will attempt to follow its earlier decisions-at the very least, for the sake of consistency and collegial harmony. Judge Sprecher in his testimony before the
Hruska Commission revealed inadvertently that judges do feel the need to
use their unpublished works:
It worries me, too, because what we are going to have to do
now, I think, and this is probably the next step, we are going to
have to have some kind of an intracourt index of unpublished
opinions, indexed according to the subject matter and so forth.
These matters are going to have to be available for the court, even
though they cannot be cited by the court or to the court.
I see nothing underhanded about something like that. It just
means that internally we will be consistent and that different panels
of the court in unpublished orders are not coming out with different results at the same time, or even at different times.
To me, the biggest argument against the people who say citation should be allowed is to permit the court to have full availability
and use of its opinions for its own intra-court procedures, but without citing them to the outside world because they are not prece153. See, e.g., Durkin v. Davis, 390 F. Supp. 249, 254 (E.D. Va. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 538 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1976):
Although the Court is mindful of the Fourth Circuit's admonition that memorandum
decisions are not to be accorded precedential value, • • • the legal trend evinced by
these four memorandum decisions, with all seven active judges participating in one
or more of them, leads the Court to the conclusion that it is now the law in this
circuit that an individual convicted of a crime has a constitutional entitlement to
pre-conviction contmement sentence credit, whether indigent or not.
Durkin relied on Mohr v. Jordan, 370 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Md. 1974), where the court had
used the same reasonmg to reach the same result. Despite the Mohr court's express reliance
on three unpublished decisions (indicating a need for published law on the question), the
Fourth Circwt did not publish its altirmance of the decision. Mohr v. Jordan, No. 74-1496
(4th Cir. JWie 10, 1974). The Fourth Circuit, on appeal in Durkin, agreed with the lower
court's disposition of the substantive issues. Sticking by its guns, it did not cite its own WI·
published work; it did, however, cite Mohr, a district court decision based on Wipublished
Fourth Circuit decisions. Thus, the circle was completed.
154. At the very least, the individual members of the panel will know.
155. See Llewellyn, Case Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SoCIAL SCIENCES 249 (1930).
A witness before the Hruska Commission, Professor Terrence Sandalow, pointed to an analogous situation:
I confess I just have not given enough thought to the problem of publication of
opinions. It does seem to me that the difficulties that are pointed to in the Commission's report of how you handle Wipublished opinions are very large difficulties indeed. Do you prohibit counsel from thinking about these, from taking them into
account, from citing them to the court"l
We have studies of arbitrators which indicate that even though they are in a
process which theoretically forbids consideration of precedent, it is nonetheless an
important factor in their judgment, and I do not see how the courts would be able
to avoid a similar process of decision, and that means that knowledgeable laWYers
will begin to argue these Wireported or unpublished opinions.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 748.
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dential. It is just a matter of consistency so that there are no
aberrations.156
It is apparent, then, that a no-citation rule will not prevent some uses
of unreported opinions by bench and bar; it will not, in other words, remedy
156. Hearings, supra note 1, at 536. The judges appear to be caught in a serious dilemma
here. If they pay no attention to their unpublished decisions they risk inconsistency; if they
consult those opinions, they appear to be using them as precedent. The depth of the problem
is revealed by the following interchange, which, though lengthy, merits quotation in full:
,MR. KIRKHAM: Your remark of a moment ago disturbs me a little, looking
at it from the standpoint of the lawyer instead of the bench. You say you would
like to keep a record of these in order that the court can refer to its prior opinions.
JUDGE SPRECHER: Yes.
MR. KIRKHAM: In other words, you are simply saying that they are going to
be precedential but that we are not going to haYe the advantage of them.
Do you think that the possibility that there should be some conflict within the
circuit in cases of this type is sufficient to have you keep a file of those things and
look at them when I do not have a chance to look at them?
JUDGE SPRECHER: I think we are zeroing in, now, on the heart of it. I am
not sure I can answer your question.
MR. KIRKHAM: Well, you have to go all one way or the other, don't you?
JUDGE SPRECHER: It seems simple to say that there shall be no citation.
That is a simple rule, but your what MR. KIRKHAM: It is simple, it is direct, it is good, and it contributes. You
have convinced me, particularly with your statement about the effect of stare decisis
in our law, in building a structure out of solid bricks, but now you are going to take
a broken brick and hold it back on me.
JUDGE SPRECHER: No. I am not going to say that the judges, by indexing
their own opinions, should use them as precedents. All I am saying is: let's use them
for what they obviously are on their face.
MR. KIRKHAM: Let's use them as precedents as non-precedents.
JUDGE SPRECHER: No.
MR KIRKHAM: I think you have to think of that again.
JUDGE SPRECHER: Not exactly that, either. For example, let's say that there
is a statement of law citing a string of cases, the way the District of Columbia sometimes does. It would certainly save a lot of time if the judge could go back and look
at that same string of cases.
It has nothing to do with how the facts were handled or how the case was
actually decided. It is just a method of having a place to look for sources of any
help you can get in building your opinion and saving judge time for the future.
MR. KIRKHAM: I guess if you want to make a memorandum of your index of
your law clerk's memos or an index of the briefs, that is one thing, but it bothers me
a great deal for you to say that you are going to make an index of your unpublished
decisions and use them to aid you in your decision in the cases, but not have them
available to me.
JUDGE SPRECHER: I think all I am speaking about is-I am talking about a
non-precedential precedent, because I am talking about aids to future production of
opinions and not their use as precedents in the stare decisis sense.
PROFESSOR LEVIN: Do I understand, Judge Sprecher, that you would not use
this index to avoid inconsistency in the court's decisions, then?
JUDGE SPRECHER: I would think not. Obviously, it would make no sense
whatsoever to say that a new case has to come out the same way this one does,
because we do not know what the facts of this other one are anyhow, so that is right.
I think the answer to your question, Professor, is that inconsistency would only
be in the sense that if I say that United States v. Gore stands for something, I don't
want to say .in another case that it stands for something else.
Obviously, that is a ridiculous example, but I am thinking particularly in terms
of just the locating of citations, and so forth, for the purpose of further research,
rather than any type of precedential value at all because, Mr. Kirkham, I want to
stay as far away from that as you do.
DEAN CRAMTON: It does seem to me that you are caught in a dilemma here.
I thought you were searching for a while for saying yes, you are concerned about
consistency, and you responded to Judge Robb that way, yes, it did bother you that
one panel might decide even in a non-precedential case one way and then another
panel would decide a case on all fours with it a different wayId. at 537-38.

HeinOnline -- 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1198 1978

1978]

NON-PRECEDENTIAL PRECEDENT

1199

the unequal access problem, a problem inherent in any limited publication
scheme.151 What the no-citation rule will do is preclude counsel and the
court from openly discussing unpublished opinions. The courts' reference
to such opinions will be sporadic and unpredictable, depending upon the
individual judge's memory and the ability of counsel to draw the court's
attention to a case without citing it. The merits of the adversarial system
will be lost in this situation.
Paradoxically, the no-citation rule may work to increase rather than
decrease the unfairness to the uninitiated lawyer. If knowledgeable counsel
cites an unpublished opinion to the court, his opponent is put on notice of
the existence of that opinion and perhaps of others. He can acquire a copy
and respond to any argument concerning it. If, on the other hand, the
sophisticated attorney uses arguments or language drawn from the unreported
case without citing it, his uninitiated opponent is unlikely to learn of :its
existence. A dialogue of sorts is going on between the knowledgeable
attorney and the court, with the opponent unable to participate. The latter
may indeed spend some time wondering why certain "magic words" are repeated in his adversary's brief and oral argument and why the court asks the
questions it does. In sum, if unreported opinions are cited, the uninitiated
lawyer can remedy his deficiency; if they cannot be cited, he may not even
know a deficiency exists.
C.

Counterarguments

Two counterarguments can be advanced against the limited publication/no citation rules.158 They do not attack the premises of the arguments
for the rules but rather assert that the rules will effect a pernicious diminution
in both judicial responsibility and judicial accountability.159
157. Others have suggested that full citation be permitted. For example, the Advisory
Committee on Procedure to the District of Columbia Circuit reco=ended that "[c]itation
should be permitted of all unpublished opinions." 1977 PUBLICATION PLANs REPoRT, supra
note 34, app. D. A contrary result was reached, however, in a poll of Seventh Circuit attorneys.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 465-70.
158. In addition to these counterarguments, constitutional challenges have also been
advanced against the rules. The grounds for the attack are that the rules offend the due process
and equal protection clauses and the first amendment. We have not discussed these arguments,
because we do not find them terribly persuasive. They are vigorously set forth in Unreported
Decisions, supra note 41, at 141-45, and Amicus Brief, supra note 128, at 45-55. The Supreme
Court has had two opportunities to pass upon the constitutionality of the rules, but did not
reach the question in either case. See note 74 supra.
159. Philosophical and legal literature provides numerous hymns to the benefits of published law.
In the preface to the first volume of his United States Reports, William Cranch made an
argument for opinion publication worth quoting at length:
Much of that uncertainty of the law, which is so frequently, and perhaps so justly,
the subject of complaint in this country, may be attributed to the want of American
reports.
Many of the causes, which are the subject of litigation in our courts, arise upon
circumstances peculiar to our situation and laws, and little information can be derived
from English authorities, to lead to a correct decision.
Uniformity, in such cases, cannot be expected, where the judicial authority is
shared among such a vast number of independent tribunals, unless the decisions of
the various courts are made known to each other. Even in the same court analogy of
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1. Judicial Responsibility. The limited publication rules may interfere
with responsible judicial decisionmaking by insulating a substantial portion
of the court's product from the demands of stare decisis. Commonwlaw
courts have an obligation to avoid inconsistency by deciding like cases in a
.like manner.160 This obligation is imposed to limit judicial discretion and
ensure full consideration of all relevant arguments. Thus, a court faced with
cases that appear to fall within the same controlling principle must treat those
cases similarly or explain in reasoned fashion why it has not done so: either
by overruling the prior case, by modifying or limiting its holding, or by
distinguishing its facts.161
Handling precedent in this fashion requires care and effort. A judge who
decides early in the process that a decision will not be published might not
expend sufficient energy on the opinion to track down all the "like" cases.
Some of these like cases will be unpublished and, in most circuits,102 not
citable to the court. A judge, therefore, may not even know of the existence
of such a case; or if he does know, he may feel no obligation to explain his
departure from its holding.163 A court might also use the cloak of nonw
publication to avoid the task of reconciling arguably inconsistent decisions.
That reconciliation would require the court to elaborate a rule that would
deprive it of the freedom to decide on the basis of "intuitive justice" rather
than articulated doctrine.164 While such license might be tempting to some
appellate judges, it is not what we expect from them.
judgment cannot be maintained, if its adjudications are sufiered to be forgotten • • •
In a government which is emphatically styled a government of laws, the least
possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge. Whatever tends to
render the laws certain, equally tends to limit that discretion; and perhaps, nothing
conduces more to that object than the publication of reports. Every case decided is a
check upon the judge: he cannot decide a similar case differently, without strong
reasons, which, for his own justification, he will wish to make public. The avenues to
corruption are thus obstructed and the sources of litigation closed.
Publication of law, in general, has seemed so important to some scholars that they have
included the concept as part of the definition of law:
Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and
measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is
proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it.
Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation [i.e., publication]. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.
28 T. AQUINAS, SuMMA THEoLOGIEA 15 (T. Gilby trans. & ed. 1966) (Question 90, Article 4).
160. See notes 136-41 and accompanying text supra.
161. This process is very important to legal consumers: it helps ensure the impartiality
and fairness of the tribunal and focuses the court's attention on controlling doctrine. The
certainty and predictability thus produced are valuable not only for the sake of justice but also
because they reduce risks (and thus social costs) associated with decision making. See R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 426-27 (2d ed. 1977), Indeed, uncertainty as to COn•
trolling law may lead to more appeals being taken, increasing the workload of the courts of
appeals. See Rubin, Vzews From the Lower Court, 23 U.C.L.A. L RBv. 448, (1975). See
generally Landes & Rosner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. LAw
& EcoN. 249 (1976).
162. See Table I, page 1207 infra,
163. See United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 670 n.10 (8th Cir. 1975), where the
court expressly refused to explain why an unpublished opinion, relied on by the Government,
was "plainly distinguishable."
164. See Rubin, supra note 161, at 451: "The ad hoc, 'railway ticket' decision-good only
~or this day and station-is a betrayal of the appellate functiotL Yet some appellate judges
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A second judicial responsibility that may be undermined by limited
publication is the obligation to develop and elaborate the law, both decisional
and statutory. There is evidence that the list of unreported decisions at times
includes opinions that break new ground.165 Several factors work to produce
this phenomenon. Even the best-intentioned and hardest-working court can
make a mistake; it is sometimes difficult to appreciate the full significance of
an opinion while writing it. Further, an opinion and the law discussed therein
can change form as it is written. There is a danger, however, that such a
metamorphosis will go unheeded if it occurs after the decision not to publish
has been made. Finally, a court may use non-publication deliberately to
suppress a lawmaking opinion.166 Indeed, in some cases it is impossible to
believe the court did not realize that it was creating law.167 Why then a
decision not to publish? Perhaps the court sought to avoid public disclosure,
either because of uncertainty over the doctrine elaborated, or because it
wished to decide the case at bar on an impermissible basis-by a rationale
that will not necessarily be extended to all like cases.168 The former reason
is sometimes advanced as a proper ground for the Supreme Court to avoid
decisions until the case has "percolated" 169 long enough for the Court to be
reasonably sure of its decision. Whatever merit there may be in this position
for the Supreme Court, it seems untenable for the circuit courts, whose
appellate jurisdiction is non-discretionary.170 The use of the non-publication
rule to avoid resolution of difficult issues in effect transforms the courts of
appeals into certiorari courts, a step hardly consistent with common understanding or congressional design.171
A final judicial obligation is the judge's responsibility to address his
conscientious efforts to each case that he must decide.172 A judge's approach
favor this kind of opinion because it leaves them elbow room to maneuver in future cases."
We suspect that a likely candidate for this treatment in unpublished cases is the summary
judgment standard-especially in prisoner cases.
165. See notes 130-35 and accompanying text supra.
166. Some circuit rules provide for publication upon request by counseL See Table I, page
1207 infra. It is doubtful that this procedure ameliorates the problem significantly. Most noninstitutional litigants and their counsel simply have no interest in making the effort (and perhaps
antagonizing the court) to see that it is done. And institutional litigants have no interest, of
course, in requesting the publication of adverse decisions.
167. "Ducking" can also take the form of refusing to flesh out-in published opinionsgeneral rules that are precedent.
168. A third possibility, limited to cases where there has been a dissent, is that a trade is
made: the dissenter(s) will not reveal division on an issue if the majority will refrain from
creating a precedent.
169. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 705 (testimony of Judge Aldisert). Note that the
Supreme Court will be denied the benefit of this percolation if circuit court opinions are not
published.
170. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (appeal from district courts).
171. Indeed, it is hard to see the difference between a denial of certiorari and a typical
unpublished opinion that briefly states the posture of the case, refers to another opinion for
authority, and then notes the disposition of the case at bar, for both are non-precedential, and
contain no overt clue as to the court's thought processes. The connection is even closer when,
as is often the case, the unpublished opinion is issued without argument by counsel.
.
172. Although not made directly in the context of non-publication, then-Circuit Judge
Stevens' reminder of the importance of the individual litigant is worth repeating:
First, it is suggested that nothing more than the destiny of the litigant is involved
9n this appeal. But that is the nature of our adversary system; since the earliest days
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to his work can easily become routine; heavy caseloads and dull, repetitive
litigation encourage decision by superficial classification or pigeonholing.
This tendency is exacerbated by the non-publication rules, because the rules
to be fully effective require early determination that the case at bar is
sufficiently routine-merely a dispute-settling case-to warrant non-publication. The very label "routine" and tl1e accompanying lack of need to
satisfy a critical audience likely result in the judge spending his time and
effort on other matters.173 Consequently, the premises that underlie the
labeling of a case "routine" are rarely re-examined. In sum, the decision
made early on controls the amount of time the judge spends on a case and
thereby validates itself; a case given minimal attention, if not routine at the
outset, is surely routine by the time the opinion is completed.174
2. Judicial Accountability. The federal appellate courts wield vast
power; their caseload affects crucial social issues. The checks on that
power come from two principal sources: (1) the Supreme Court, which has
the power to reverse or modify the decisions of the courts of appeals, and
(2) legal consumers, i.e., the bench, the bar, the scholars, and the public,
each of which exercises a more subtle type of control. The limited publication/no-citation regimes significantly diminish the accountability of the circuit
courts by rendering both types of control less effective.
a. Review by the Supreme Court. Formally, of course, the courts of
appeals are accountable only to the Supreme Court. That Court, burdened
of the common law, judges have applied and molded rules to resolve controversies
between particular litigants. Much of our law, with a special emphasis on its procedures, was evolved through the process of case-by-case adjudication.
United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1974).
173. That real trade-offs exist here was not recognized by many who testified before the
Hruska Commission. One exception was Judge .Aldisert. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 708.
See also id. at 555, 584 (testimony of Willard Lassers).
A dramatic example of this problem surfaced recently in the Supreme Court. In reviewing
an unpublished decision of the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court found that the appellate
court had filed an order that, "clearly ••• ha[d] nothing whatsoever to do with the petitioner's
case." Proctor v. Warden, 435 U.S. 559, 560 (1978). The Fourth Circuit order had
"disposed" of the case by mistaking plaintiff's requested remedy, the court in which it was
filed, and, apparently, the very name of the case. Indeed, the court seems to have confused
two cases on appeal to it. See id. at n. * While the linkage between non-publication and
assembly-line justice may be hard to establish conclusively, we suspect that in its routine
preparation of opinions for publication the Fourth Circuit might have noticed this error.
174. The discussion has proceeded thus far upon the assumption that the judges themselves
are making the early decision. In most circuits, that assumption is false. Nearly all circuits use
staff attorneys or staff law clerks (as distinguished from personal law clerks) to help screen
cases for full or summary appellate procedure. The screening decision inevitably coincides to a
great extent with the publication decision. Thus in many circuits the decision on whether a
case is given summary treatment and whether it merits a published opinion is made at least in
part by staff attorneys. Furthermore, some of the circuits use central staff to draft "routine"
opinions. See D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS 231-39 (1974), for a general survey of the use
of staff attorneys by the various circuit courts.
The point of this footnote is not to criticize staff attorneys or staff law clerks, but rather
to suggest that an early decision made by one who is not directly and closely supervised by a
particular judge is likely in many circuits to control the manner of disposition. Thus the use
of staff attorneys may combine with the non-publication rules to produce a serious diminution
in the responsibility that a judge bears for his decision. Judge Thompson of the California
Court of Appeals has expressed similar concerns over the relation between professional staff
and non-publication rules. Thompson, Mitigating the Damages-one Judge and No Judge
Appellate Decisions, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 476 (1975).
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by its own heavy caseload, husbands its resources by choosing carefully the
cases it will review. An unpublished opinion is less likely to be reviewed for
several reasons. First, because an unpublished opinion (in most circuits) has
no precedential value, the felt need to correct error in such an opinion is less
than with published opinions. The Supreme Court is confronted merely with
a wrong result, not with "bad law." It is not often that the Court will make
room on its discretionary and highly crowded docket for a case that merely
settles a dispute incorrectly,l75 that is, a case whose error is not likely to be
perpetuated in future cases.
The no-citation rules also significantly diminish the possibility of review
based upon a conflict among the circuits. The very notion of a conflict is
theoretically attenuated; can it be said, for instance, that a conflict exists
between two circuit courts that have come to opposite results on a single
issue when each one insists that its determination is not precedential? Is that
a conflict or merely a quirk? A more practical aspect of this problem is that
an attorney seeking a writ of certiorari is unlikely to know of the unpublished
law of other circuits and, therefore, will be unable to draw the Supreme
Court's attention to the existence of a conflict.
Finally, unpublished opinions are typically not as thorough or elaborate
as their reported cousins. This phenomenon affects the likelihood of Supreme
Court review to the extent that less comprehensive and less thoughtful
opinions make it more difficult for the Court to determine exactly what the
lower court has done. Truncated, elliptical opinions do not draw the reviewer's attention as readily to the substantive issues of the cases. With so
many petitions for certiorari to review, the Supreme Court will naturally
show more interest in those cases in which systematic, published lower court
opinions highlight the issues.176
b. Review by Legal Consumers. The Supreme Court, of course, can
review only a tiny fraction of the cases decided by the courts of appeals.177
With review from above so unlikely, the real accountability of the courts of
appeals is to the bench, the bar, the scholars, and the public. Unpublished
opinions, especially ones ·that cannot be cited, will generally not receive critical
commentary from those groups for the obvious reason that they will go unnoticed. A less obvious consideration is that there is relatively little incentive
to comment upon an opinion that is not "law."
175. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SU!'REMB CoURT PRACriCB 172 (4th ed. 1969). A court of
appeals that recognizes this may avoid review of its decisions by not publishing them. This
potential problem was recognized by a judge of the California intermediate appellate court
system. Kanner, supra note 134, at 445, n.74.
176. But see Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 (1972), in which the Court granted
certiorari in a case where the Fifth Circuit's opinion consisted of one word. The Court
remanded the case to obtain "the benefit of the insight of the Court of Appeals." For a more
complete discussion of Taylor, see note 46 supra.
177. In the 1976 Term, for example, the Supreme Court, by written opinion, disposed of
111 cases from the inferior federal courts. The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv.
70, 299-301, table ill (1977). During the 1975 fiscal year, the courts of appeals disposed of
10,125 appeals, 1976 PUBLICATION PLANS REPORT, supra note 34, at 3. Thus, no more than
roughly one percent of those terminations were disposed of by the Supreme Court with written
opinions.
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Scholarly commentary can also serve as an effective check on the work
of the circuit courts. The sifting of judicial opinions to isolate problems of
inconsistency and superficial analysis is a useful part of our legal system:
awareness of a knowledgeable audience--one that comments and criticizesis helpful in keeping judges on their best behavior. Non-publication rules
make scholarly evaluation difficult, since most commentators will simply be
unaware of the existence or the content of the unpublished opinions. Thus,
these opinions will often escape critical scrutiny.178
Other important benefits of scholarship will also be diminished by the
non-publication rules. Legal scholars pinpoint undiscovered issues and propose novel solutions to recurrent problems; 179 perhaps more important, they
synthesize new ideas from apparently disparate fields.1 8° These scholarly
endeavors depend on the commentators' complete and ready access to all the
efforts of the courts in an area; that access will be significantly curtailed by
the non-publication rules.
A final form of accountability-perhaps the most important of allcomes from within. Judges feel an obligation to themselves, their colleagues,
and their office to produce coherent legal work of high quality. Rules that
rob an opinion of its precedential value considerably diminish this internal
accountability. Karl Llewellyn, discussing the reasons why judges write
opinions, made the point this way:
In our law the opinion has in addition a central forward-looking
function which reaches far beyond the cause in hand: the opinion
has as one if not its major office to show how like cases are
properly to be decided in the future. This also frequently casts its
shadow before, and affects the deciding of the cause in hand. (If I
cannot give a reason I should be willing to stand to, I must shrink
from the very result which otherwise seems good.) Thus the opinion
serves as a steadying factor which aids reckonability.181

The limited publication/no-citation rules, in sum, are subject to the
persuasive counterargument that they tend to leave some of the most powerful
persons in the country accountable (with regard to at least part of their
work) to no one-not even to themselves or to each other.
178. This point is forcefully made in Kanner, supra note 134, at 44445.
179. Among the best known articles to do this is Warren, New Light on the History ol
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HAR.v. L. REv. 49, 84-88 (1923). It was Professor
Warren's article which Justice Brandeis cited as "the more recent research of a competent
scholar" in Erie RR. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938). Justice Brandeis used tho
article to demonstrate that the accepted
meaning of the term "laws" as used in tho Rules of
1
Decision Act was incorrect.
180. Perhaps the most famous example is Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). The authors "reviewed a number of cases in which relief had been
afforded on the basis of defamation, invasion of some property right, or breach of confidence
or implied contract, and concluded that they were in reality based on a broader principle that
was entitled to separate recognition." W. PROSSER, Tlm LAw OF ToRTS 802 (4th ed. 1971).
181. K. LLEWELLYN, Tim COMMON LAW TRADmON 26 (1960).
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CONCLUSION

The case against the limited publication/no-citation rules is a strong one.
The premises upon which the rules are based are subject to serious question,
and powerful arguments can be advanced against the entire concept. It is not
surprising, therefore, that a substantial number of critics have spoken against
the system-critics from the bench, the bar, and the schools.182
Furthermore, the widespread adoption of the limited publication/nocitation rules-a major change in the operation of the circuit courts 183-has
been accomplished with relatively little public debate or legislative participation.184 Certainly there is little reason to believe that non-publication has the
enthusiastic support of wide majorities in any of the courts' constituencies.
Given the opposition to the rules and the empirical, logical, and institutional
problems they pose, the circuits would be well advised to proceed more
cautiously.
Yet recognition of difficulties with the rules does not ameliorate the
problems that led to their adoption. The heavy caseload of the courts of
appeals will not disappear. While the flood could be attacked at its source
through methods such as jurisdictional contractions, it is unlikely that the
flow will diminish sufficiently to remove the problem.1B5
The dilemma posed, then, is how to cope with steadily increasing caseloads without compromising the appellate process or undermining the virtues
of stare decisis. The most appealing compromise we have seen is the system
used in the Tenth Circuit. That court permits free citation of unpublished
opinions, provided that a copy is served on opposing counsel. In addition,
the court prepares a subject matter index of all unpublished opinions available to all at a modest fee. Copies of any unpublished opinions can be
obtained from the clerk of the court.1BB
This system seems to remedy many of the defects of the orthodox
limited publication/no-citation rules. Judges are likely to feel more pressure
to avoid inconsistent decisions and suppressed precedent since their unpublished opinions are available for use and subject to scrutiny.187 The
182. In addition to the critics cited throughout notes 116-81 and accompany text supra,
seeP. CARRINGTON et al., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 35-41 (1976). Also, a majority of district court
judges in the First Circuit voted in a "straw" poll vote to have all opinions published. 1977
PUBUCATION PLANs REPoRT, supra note 34, app. D. It is not clear how this "straw poll" was
conducted.
183. The percentage of published dispositions by the courts of appeals in written opinion
decreased from 48.4% in 1973 to 37.2% in 1977. 1977 PUBLICATION PLANS REPORT, supra
note 34, at 3.
184. There was, of course, some legislative and public participation in the form of the
Hruska Commission hearings. See note 1 supra. Congress has not passed on the schemes,
however, and it seems fair to say that the great part of the bar and the scholarly co=unity
. knows literally nothing of them.
185. The metaphor is Judge Friendly's. See Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the
Flow, 59 CORNELL L.Q. 634 (1974).
Other compromises of the appellate process have also been suggested; for example, the
curtailment of oral argument. See Appellate Justice: 1975, supra note 7, at 2-32.
186. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra for further explanation of the Tenth
Circuit system.
187. See notes 158-74 and accompanying text supra.
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unequal access problem 188 is substantially remedied by the subject matter
index. Similarly, the courfs work is available and indexed so that it is less
insulated from critical evaluation by commentators.18g
Before endorsing the Tenth Circuit's plan too enthusiastically, however,
more information concerning it is required. The system can be no better than
the index; it would be helpful to know if the index is sufficiently detailed to
inform legal consumers. Another question to be answered concerns the
efficiency of the system. Does it result in the substantial time savings and
increased productivity noted in some other circuits? Will a system that works
in a court with the relatively modest caseload of the Tenth Circuit also work
in considerably larger circuits such as the Ninth and the Fifth? 100
Here, as in any discussion of judicial reform, "caution', should be the
watchword. As Professor Charles Wright noted a decade ago, "we should be
wary of reforms that are attractive in terms of saving time but have unnoticed
substantive effects., 101 Our appellate system has virtues that have stood the
test of time--virtues that may not be appreciated until they are lost through
precipitious reform. It seems far better to strive for needed mechanical
changes, such as widely urged jurisdictional restrictions and more judges with
better support services, than to undertake organic reform that may substantially alter the character of appellate justice.

188. See notes 149-57 and accompanying text supra.
189. See notes 177-81 and accompanying text supra.
190. In 1977, the Tenth Circuit recorded 940 dispositions following argument or submission; the Ninth, 2,333; the Fifth, 2,221. 1977 PUBLICATION PLANS REPORT, supra 34.
191. Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A. J. 742, 747
(1966). See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 931 (testimony of Haworth).
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1. Establishes a new rule of law or alters
an existing rule.

X

X

X

X

X

2. Involves a legal issue of continuing public
interest.

X

X

X

X

X

3. Criticizes existing law.

X

X

X

4. Creates or resolves a real or apparent
conflict with published decisions.

X

X

X

S. Applies an established rule of law to
new facts.

X

X

X

X

X

9. Calls attention to a rule of law which has
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X

11. Has institutional value.

X

14. Is accompanied by a separate opinion which
the author wants reported.

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

10. Has precedential value.
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X

X
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X

X
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X

X

X

X

X
X

t Anyone who is familiar with the e:..:cellent works of Joseph Spaniol, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, will. recognize these charts.
They are modeled on charts that he has prepared in conjunction with his reports to the Judicial Conference of the United States.

